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Abstract 
 
DIANE SMEDBERG: On Epistemic Egalitarianism For My P-Zombie Twin: In Defense of The 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
(Under the direction of Dr. James J. Pearson)   
 
One current debate in philosophy of mind concerns the ontological and epistemological nature of 
phenomenal consciousness. Two major camps dominate this debate: property dualists and 
physicalists. For property dualists, the existence of an epistemic gap between the physical and 
the phenomenal—that our knowledge of the physical does not secure our knowledge of the 
phenomenal—entails an ontological gap, so that the physical and the phenomenal exist as 
fundamentally distinct domains. For physicalists, the ontological gap does not exist because there 
is only one ontological type of phenomenal property. 
 In this paper, I will criticize the property dualists’ position. I concentrate on one of the 
most popular property dualists’ arguments—the conceivability argument. In addition, whilst 
analyzing the conceivability argument, I hope to draw out an illicit change in the use of 
‘epistemic situation,’ thus adding further support to the instability of the conceivability 
argument. 
 Further, I argue in favour of the conceptual isolation seen between our phenomenal and 
physical concepts by defending the ‘Phenomenal Concept Strategy’. Conceptual isolation is 
responsible for our being able to conceive of ‘philosophical zombie twins’, beings that are 
functionally, physically, and psychologically identical to us and yet which lack phenomenal 
conscious experiences. The phenomenal concept strategy is designed to provide an explanation 
of how it is that we can conceive of such beings whilst remaining physicalists and so endorsing 
an ontological monism. In order for the phenomenal concept strategy to prove fruitful, the 
physicalist must substantiate that we share an equally good epistemic situation to our 
philosophical zombie twins. Our philosophical zombie twins assert claims pertaining to their 
phenomenal conscious experiences in the same manner that you and I do, however, ex hypothesi, 
we know that they do not possess phenomenal consciousness. I analyze the physicalists’ account 
of our philosophical zombie twins’ beliefs pertaining to their own phenomenal consciousness 
and argue for epistemic equality—that our philosophical zombie twins do possess a certain type 
of consciousness.  
IN DEFENSE OF THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPT STRATEGY 
 3 
 My thesis has two major goals. First, I hope to weaken the foundation of the property 
dualists’ argument—the conceivability argument—and second, to force the property dualist to 
reevaluate the phenomenal concept strategy upon the grounds that it was developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: philosophical zombie, conceivability argument, physicalism, property dualism, 
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On Epistemic Egalitarianism For My P-Zombie Twin: 5 
In Defense of The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
1 Introduction 
One of the main questions in philosophy of mind is the ontological question of phenomenal 
consciousness: ‘What exactly constitutes phenomenal consciousness?’ i  One of the main 
epistemological questions asked is: ‘Will cognitive science be able to provide a physical 10 
explanation to our questions that pertain to consciousness?’ Due to current technology, 
philosophers argue that the cognitive sciences will not be able to provide us with a physical 
explanation of phenomenal consciousness, but it is hoped that future science will be able to do 
so. This lack of an explanation creates the explanatory gap seen between physical reality and 
phenomenal reality. Some philosophers maintain that phenomenal consciousness is completely 15 
governed by basic physical facts, thereby denying an ontological gap. However, others, such as 
David Chalmers, argue that the explanatory gap entails an ontological gap. His reason is that 
phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to physical properties. For example, the property 
“being pure gas” can be reduced to chemical properties, “being C8H18”. This position is known 
as ‘property dualism’. To support his position, he argues that we cannot disprove that other 20 
entities, such as philosophical zombies (p-zombie), functionally, physically, and psychologically 
identical to us, exist yet lack phenomenal consciousness. For Chalmers and other property 
dualists, no amount of knowledge of the physical facts will necessitate why our experiences are 
accompanied by phenomenal consciousness. Some physicalists argue, in opposition to property 
dualists, that an explanatory gap does not necessarily entail an ontological gap. 25 
1.1 The Hard Problem of Consciousness  
 
Chalmers (1995) maintains that the most puzzling feature of phenomenal consciousness is that of 
explaining subjective experience. He labels this the hard problem. Chalmers writes: 
Consciousness, the subjective experience of an inner self, poses one of the greatest 30 
challenges to neuroscience. Even a detailed knowledge of the brain’s workings and the 
neural correlates of consciousness may fail to explain how or why human beings have 
self-aware minds (ibid.: 90). 
Chalmers writes that the sciences do not know why our “physical processes are accompanied by 
conscious experience” (ibid.: 93). He wants to know why we should have any experience at all 35 
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and suggests that unconscious robots or androids could perform the same undertakings as we do. 
Chalmers notes: “…subjective experience seems to emerge from a physical process. But we have 
no idea how or why this is” (ibid.: 93-4). Chalmers does not deny that our conscious states arise 
from the brain but would like a theory of consciousness that answers his questions.  
 According to Chalmers, the hard problem is that of providing an answer to the ‘how and 40 
why’ questions that phenomenal consciousness seems to force us to ask. We are not looking for 
an answer as to which neural correlate(s) of consciousness are responsible for phenomenal 
consciousness. What we want to understand is the ‘how and why’ this causal chain from the 
physical to the phenomenal yields conscious experiences. Without answers to these questions, 
some philosophers posit that we are left with three types of epistemic gaps: the explanatory gap, 45 
the conceptual gap, and the knowledge gap. These gaps are used to form arguments in an attempt 
to show that the physical and phenomenal properties are ontologically but not necessarily 
conceptually distinct entities, and so existing independent of one another.  
1.2 Oh Those Troublesome Epistemic Gaps 
 50 
All three of these gaps—explanatory gap, conceptual gap, knowledge gap—are understood as a 
form of an epistemic gap in that they individually repudiate an epistemic link between that of the 
physical and the phenomenal. This link encompasses what it is that we can explain, conceive, 
and know. These gaps are used to form arguments in an attempt to show that a set of concepts 
cannot be reduced to another set of defined concepts, and the ontological gap exists if a set of 55 
properties or facts cannot be reduced to another set of properties or facts. 
 The explanatory gap is understood as follows. If an agent S cannot provide an 
explanation of phenomenal consciousness in pure physical terms, she will see the gap between 
the physical facts and an explanation of phenomenal facts. In other terms, the physical is unable 
to explain the phenomenal. The explanatory gap suggests an ontological gap because she cannot 60 
deduce a physical explanation from the phenomenal. That is, if by way of the physical you 
cannot explain the phenomenal, then the phenomenal is not a physical fact. Therefore, an 
ontological gap exists between the physical and the phenomenal. 
 The conceptual (or conceivability) gap is understood as follows. If an agent S can 
conceive of the physical without the phenomenal, then she will see the gap due to our ability to 65 
imagine such a world in all its physicality, but missing phenomenal consciousness. The 
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conceptual gap suggests an ontological gap from conceivability to metaphysical possibility for 
the reason that one may infer from the assertion that if it is conceivable that the physical facts do 
not entail the phenomenal facts, then it is metaphysically possible. From here, she will conclude 
that physicalism is false. She will infer that physicalism is false due to her reasoning that if a 70 
logically possible world (W1) exists that is identical to our world (W) but lacking consciousness, 
then consciousness must be an additional ontological fact. 
 The knowledge gap is understood as follows. If an agent S has complete knowledge of 
the physical but cannot deduce the phenomenal from the physical, then she will see that having 
complete knowledge of the physical does not suffice for having knowledge of the phenomenal. 75 
This results in an agent S being unable to infer the phenomenal facts from physical facts i.e., 
resulting in a knowledge gap between the physical and the phenomenal. The knowledge gap 
suggests an ontological gap due to an agent S being unable to deduce the phenomenal facts from 
the physical facts; leaving an agent S positing that consciousness must be an additional 
ontological fact. 80 
 In sum, any of these gaps give reason to think physicalism is false. 
1.3 Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) 
 
A posteriori physicalists turn to a powerful strategy known as the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
(PCS) to resist the inference of an ontological gap stemming from an epistemic gap that many 85 
argue is shown through Frank Jackson’s (1982) Knowledge Argument. In the Knowledge 
Argument, we are told that Mary is an omniscient neuroscientist that has been held prisoner, 
since birth, in a monochrome room. Mary knows all the physical facts and has in her possession 
further information, assumptions. These assumptions are otherwise known as bridge laws. Mary 
has full capacity to deduce what it will be like to experience the colour red, yet, when Mary is 90 
released from her monochrome room, many philosophers argue that Mary learns something new 
when she experiences red for the first time. If this is true, then the bridge laws were of no use to 
Mary and we are still left with our original difficulty of getting from the physical facts to the 
phenomenal facts. Due to this argument, Brian Loar (1990) developed what Daniel Stoljar 
(2005) has labeled the PCS. Loar (1990/1997) explains that the isolation of our phenomenal 95 
concepts from our physical concepts is responsible for the issues that follow from the Knowledge 
Argument. Moreover, conceptual isolation explains why it seems that p-zombies are conceivable. 
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If the phenomenal concept strategy is successful, it will provide an explanation as to why an 
explanatory gap exists, and why it seems plausible that p-zombies are conceivable. It may appear 
that how type-B physicalists explain phenomenal consciousness will elide a reductive and non-100 
reductive explanatory structure. This is because they can uphold the non-reduction for a set of 
concepts, thereby accepting the existence of the epistemic gaps, while nevertheless arguing for 
the reduction of the corresponding sets of properties selected by those concepts, thereby denying 
the ontological gap. 
 1.4 A Posteriori Physicalism 105 
 
My focus in this paper will be on a posteriori physicalism (dubbed “type-B physicalism” by 
Chalmers, 2002).ii Janet Levin (2008) tells us that type-B physicalism is the doctrine that holds 
that even though our phenomenal states are identical with physical states, our phenomenal 
concepts are not connected, a priori, to our functional or physical concepts (ibid.: 402). This 110 
disconnect between our concepts is known as conceptual isolation. Phenomenal concepts are the 
concepts of an experience that is perceived by our senses. This type of experience is 
characterised as a phenomenal experience, i.e., the subjective experience. For someone to obtain 
a phenomenal concept, one must stand in an acquaintance relationship with “what it is like-ness” 
to have this experience (an expression coined by Thomas Nagel, 1974).  115 
1.5 Qualia and Conscious Experience 
 
The word “quale” is very confusing in its own right, because there is not an operational 
definition that everyone agrees upon. The term dates back to 1623 when Galileo Galilei wrote 
“The Assayer”. Qualia are the characters of conscious experience: the ‘what it is like’-ness of the 120 
sensation of one’s private subjective (first-person) experience. In other terms, qualia are the 
sensations you experience when you hear middle C played, see neon green, taste vegemite, are in 
a painful state, experience an orgasm, experience happiness, or sadness, etc. One may ask, 
“When I see neon green I am cognitively processing this information, but why do I have a visual 
experience? How can I explain the sensation of being in pain?” We can understand that these 125 
qualities can be explained by the functional or physical but that is not what we want to know. We 
want to know why the physical is attended by the phenomenal.iii According to the property 
dualist, the physicalists’ story cannot account for why our experiences should be accompanied 
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with qualia. The property dualist’s account of qualia states that qualia are ontologically distinct 
properties and that they cannot be reduced to something physical, or explained by something that 130 
is not phenomenal. They cannot hold that the physical provides us with our conscious 
experiences. According to the a posteriori physicalist, qualia are reducible to physical properties 
because qualia are part of certain brain functions and therefore are not ontologically distinct.  
1.6 A P-Zombie?  
 135 
So, what exactly is a p-zombie? The notion of ‘p-zombies’ has been the topic of many heated 
debates among philosophers such as Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and Robert Kirk. P-zombies are 
not to be confused with the zombies of Hollywood. The zombies of Hollywood are creatures that 
are somewhat conscious, whereas p-zombies lack all consciousness. In addition, Hollywood 
zombies are distinguishable from humans (skin rotting off, abnormal gait, oozing wounds, etc.), 140 
whereas p-zombies are indistinguishable from humans. To make the distinction between a 
Hollywood zombie and a p-zombie clear, Chalmers offers us the following provocative 
description:   
This creature [p-zombie] is molecule for molecule identical to me, identical to me 
functionally: he will be processing the same sort of information, reacting in a similar way 145 
to inputs… with indistinguishable behavior resulting. He will be psychologically identical 
to me…. It is just that none of this functioning will be accompanied by any real conscious 
experience. There will be no phenomenal feel. There is nothing it is like to be a [p-] 
zombie (Chalmers, 1996: 94-5, emphasis original).  
Your p-zombie twin is identical to you. She will behave exactly as you do, will function as you 150 
do, and will be cognitively identical to you, but—and this is the crucial point—will lack all 
phenomenal conscious experience. Although your zombie twin has the ability to ascertain facts 
about the world, she is never in a position to have a phenomenal conscious experience of the 
world.  
 In the above passage, Chalmers distinguishes between a p-zombie being functionally and 155 
psychologically identical to us. For something to be functionally identical to us, it must be able 
to process inputs in the same manner as we do and its behaviour, the output, will be exactly as 
we would behave given the same stimuli, i.e., the resulting behaviour of my p-zombie twin will 
be indistinguishable from my behaviour. For example, when the p-zombie perceives an apple, 
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she will be able to process information concerning the apple and she will respond to the apple in 160 
the same manner to me. For something to be psychologically identical to us, it must have the 
abilities of introspection, providing verbal reports, paying attention, learning, remembering, etc. 
For example, when the p-zombie eats broccoli, she will be able to provide some type of report 
about the taste. Chalmers notes that the concepts just mentioned, which we are able to provide a 
functional analysis for, are ultimately found to have a psychological basis. For example, when 165 
tasting broccoli, our gustatory system will provide us with a functional response and how we 
interpret the taste will provide us with our psychological response. This is an issue for what 
Chalmers calls property dualism.  
 Property dualists, such as Chalmers, maintain that if a p-zombie is conceivable, then a p-
zombie is metaphysically possible. It is important to remember that for the property dualist 170 
neither of these for the p-zombie, the functional or the psychological states, will ever be 
accompanied by a phenomenal conscious experience. A priori physicalists deny that p-zombies 
are conceivable, thus rendering the notion of p-zombies metaphysically impossible.iv A posteriori 
physicalists maintain that p-zombies are conceivable but, like a priori physicalists, they deny 
metaphysical possibility. Even though property dualists and physicalists disagree about whether 175 
p-zombies are conceivable and question their metaphysical possibility, they do agree that the 
language of phenomenal concepts is distinct.  
1.7 The Language of Phenomenal Concepts 
 
Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet (2007) explain there are two distinct ways we go about 180 
deploying phenomenal concepts: using first-person (private, subjective, phenomenal) language 
or third-person (public, descriptive, physical) language. First-person language that is about a 
phenomenal concept will be such that it encompasses thinking about states such as ‘this’ 
experience or ‘that’ experience. Third-person language is about non-phenomenal concepts, 
which are objective, and publically recognizable, that provides a description of a phenomenal 185 
concept. For example, my p-zombie twins’ concept may be different from my phenomenal 
concept but as long as we are both speaking third-personally, those concepts will refer to the 
same thing. Therefore, phenomenal concepts can be described in third-person language.  
 The position I will defend in this paper is that our first-person access to phenomenal 
consciousness leads us, mistakenly, to hypothesize that qualia are ontologically distinct. Since 190 
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we imagine qualia in this manner, we have the ability to conceive of p-zombies who lack the 
phenomenal properties of consciousness. I argue that the third-person characterization can be 
attuned to how we perceive phenomenal properties in the functional physical domain thus 
denying the metaphysical significance of qualia. If our third-person characterization is 
justifiable, then the metaphysical possibility of p-zombies lacking qualia is dispelled just as type-195 
B physicalists maintain.  
1.8 Why Do Property Dualists Posit A P-Zombie? 
 
Philosophers of mind posit p-zombies as an intuition pump specifically designed to test our 
intuitions about the relationship between the nature of the physical and the phenomenal. 200 
Philosophers of mind have spilt much ink in their attempts to dispel the conceptual and 
metaphysical possibility of p-zombies. Nevertheless, just as we see in the theatres, we encounter 
great difficulties when attempting to kill zombies. Physicalism is the doctrine that holds 
everything is physical in nature including phenomenal consciousness. The conceivability of p-
zombies creeping around the metaphysical terrain appears to have damaging consequences for 205 
physicalism. Therefore, these p-zombies have the potential to debunk physicalism. The marrow 
of the problem is that p-zombies are very easily conceived; this generates a belief that they are 
metaphysically possible i.e., conceivability implies metaphysical possibility.  
2 Arguing for the Existence of an Ontological Gap 
 210 
 At the root of PCS is the idea that the epistemic gaps are determined by how we think about 
qualia, i.e., the concepts we deploy when thinking about qualia: it is not the nature of qualia itself 
that determines the epistemic gaps. PCS is not provided as a defence of physicalism, but is 
provided as a defence against the allegation that there exists an ontological gap in the presence of 
an explanatory gap. Contrary to the position of the type-B physicalist, the property dualist argues 215 
that the conditional statement ‘if it is the case that all truths are physical truths, then phenomenal 
truths are physical truths’ is false and not knowable a priori, then there exists an ontological gap 
between that of the physical and phenomenal. The following shows how the property dualist 
goes about arguing for the existence of an ontological gap that shows physicalism is false: 
1) There is an epistemic gap between the truths of the physical and the phenomenal. 220 
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2) If there is an epistemic gap between the truths of the physical and the 
phenomenal, then there is an ontological gap, and physicalism is false. 
3) If it is the case that all truths are physical truths, then phenomenal truths are 
physical truths is not a priori knowable. 
            ____________ 225 
4)      Physicalism is false. (Chalmers, 2010: 110). 
Type-B physicalists argue that premise (2) is false. Type-B physicalists argue, contrary to the 
property dualists, that the conditional statement ‘if it is the case that all truths are physical truths, 
then phenomenal truths are physical truths’ is true and is not a priori knowable but, this does not 
result in an ontological gap between physical truths and phenomenal truths. The key component 230 
of PCS is that it furnishes an explanation for why we are confronted with these gaps that is 
compatible with physicalism. By furnishing a lucid theory of how these gaps—the conceptual 
gap, the explanatory gap, the knowledge gap—can be maintained in a world that is completely 
physical, the type-B physicalist is able to show that the a priority that property dualists argue for, 
which is the link between the ontological gap and the epistemic gaps, is false.v  235 
Interlude 
 
Chalmers specifically attacks the type-B physicalists’ position and this is why I will focus 
exclusively on this version of physicalism. On one hand, the type-B physicalist will agree with 
the property dualist that we have the ability to conceive of p-zombies, that there is an 240 
explanatory gap, and that the gap cannot be closed. On the other hand, the type-B physicalist will 
deny that p-zombies are metaphysically possible. The type-B physicalist claims there can be an 
explanation that is consistent with physicalism for why there is an explanatory gap, and that their 
account will predict a gap. They are able to assert the conditional statement ‘if it is the case that 
all truths are physical truths, then phenomenal truths are physical truths’ is true and not knowable 245 
a priorily, thus the a priori entailment can no longer be used against the conditionals’ ontological 
importance.vi   
 Chalmers raises an objection to PCS and argues that PCS is ‘doomed to fail’ (Chalmers, 
1996: 104). My hope is to defend PCS from the objection that Chalmers raises by arguing that 
his objection is itself in a rather troubling position; that is, his objection is itself subject to a 250 
quandary and thus PCS is not doomed to fail.  
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The landscape of this paper is as follows: Sections 3 - 5 is dedicated to the exposition of 
Chalmers’ argument against PCS. In section 6, I will develop phase (1) of a quandary that shows 
the various outcomes when we cast C in phenomenal language (first-person), and then cast C in 
topic-neutral language (third-person) whilst casting our epistemic situation in phenomenal 255 
language throughout. In section 7, I will offer some objections and replies to phase (1). In section 
8, I will present phase (2) of the quandary and argue that when we look at our epistemic situation 
in topic-neutral terms, my p-zombie twin shares an equally good epistemic situation as ours, 
contra Chalmers. 
3 Thesis C 260 
 
Proponents of PCS argue that thesis C is successful in explaining why we are confronted with the 
explanatory gap by following certain criteria. The content of this thesis is such that C ascribes 
key psychological features to all human beings who are phenomenally conscious. We can say 
that C is responsible for the lack of interaction between our physical and phenomenal concepts 265 
(conceptual isolation). Further, we can say that since human beings have C, this is why we have 
the ability to conceive of entities such as p-zombies. Therefore, the key psychological features 
will include all aspects of human mentality, and will explain our epistemic situation concerning 
phenomenal consciousness, that is: 
(i) C is true (we do have the key psychological features);  270 
(ii) C clarifies our epistemic situation in explaining why we are faced with various 
types of epistemic gaps; and  
(iii) C itself can be explicated in physical terms (why we have key psychological 
features) (Chalmers, 2006: 172).       
Meeting criterion (iii) amounts to an explanation of the functional and psychological by way of 275 
physical terms thus explaining the explanatory gap between the functional and physical on the 
one hand and the phenomenal on the other. Chalmers (2006, 2010) contends that no explanation 
of phenomenal properties will satisfy stipulation (ii) or (iii). In order for thesis C to succeed, (i) 
and (ii) cannot fail. If (i) or (ii) fail, our explanatory gap will not have been explained. If (iii) 
fails, then thesis C cannot provide a way to bridge the explanatory gap although "even if 280 
consciousness cannot be physically explained, we might be able to physically explain the key 
psychological features and our epistemic situation" (Chalmers, 2010: 134). If any of the three 
IN DEFENSE OF THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPT STRATEGY 
 16 
fail, then it is possible that each criterion, in its own right, will develop a new gap (Chalmers, 
2006: 172). Chalmers notes that some physicalists are not dedicated to (iii). Without (iii), he 
contends that PCS fails to block the inference from the explanatory gap to an ontological gap.  285 
4 On Our Epistemic Situation 
 
In defending his position, Chalmers’ will invoke what he calls ‘epistemic situations’. Chalmers 
(2006), when discussing the first horn of the dilemma (discussed below) suggests our epistemic 
situation might be identical to the explanatory gap we are confronted with between the facts of 290 
the physical and phenomenal. Chalmers (2010) asserts that in order for thesis C to provide an 
explanation of our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness, C must provide an 
explanation for why we are faced with these epistemic gaps. The major claim that Chalmers' is 
making is that an explanation of our epistemic situation must include an explanation of why it is 
we are confronted with the various epistemic gaps. 295 
 Turning to the second horn of the dilemma, Chalmers (2006, 2010) tells us we should 
conceptualize our epistemic situation differently:   
[T]he epistemic situation of an individual includes the truth-values of their beliefs and the 
epistemic status of their beliefs (as justified or unjustified and as cognitively significant 
or insignificant). As before, an epistemic situation (and a sentence E characterizing it) 300 
should be understood in topic-neutral terms, so that it does not build in claims about the 
presence of phenomenal states or phenomenal concepts. We can say that two individuals 
share their epistemic situation when they have corresponding beliefs, all of which have 
corresponding truth-values and epistemic status (Chalmers, 2010: 316; 2006: 176-77). 
The definition that Chalmers provides for epistemic status is almost as vague as his definition for 305 
epistemic situation. I take it that Chalmers is asserting, in the first and third sentence, that our 
epistemic situation includes our beliefs’ truth-values and our beliefs’ epistemic status, which can 
be shared by two individuals. Perhaps an example will clarify. Hansel shares Gretel’s epistemic 
situation if and only if (i) Hansel and Gretel’s beliefs correspond with one another; (ii) Hansel 
and Gretel’s beliefs have corresponding truth-values; and (iii) Hansel and Gretel’s beliefs have 310 
the same epistemic status, i.e., the same justificatory strength and cognitive significance. In the 
second sentence, Chalmers is asserting that our epistemic situation ought to be cast in topic-
neutral language.  
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 This second way of conceptualizing our epistemic situation is important because 
Chalmers argues that my p-zombie twin will not share my epistemic situation due to there being 315 
no way to directly ascertain the content of a p-zombies’ beliefs. Further, according to Chalmers’ 
intuition, whatever beliefs the p-zombie might hold, those beliefs seem false or not as justified as 
ours might be (Chalmers, 2006: 177). Chalmers is asserting that in order for my p-zombie twin 
and I to have a different epistemic situation our corresponding beliefs cannot have the same 
truth-value and/ or the same epistemic status. Since Chalmers knows that it is notoriously 320 
difficult to ascertain the content of someone’s beliefs, he needs to clarify how to conceptualize 
the notion of ‘epistemic situation’; thus, he offers us the above second definition. 
5 Will The Master Argument Spell Trouble for Thesis C? 
5.1 The Master Argument 
 325 
Chalmers (2006, 2010) argues that PCS is doomed to fail because there can be "no psychological 
features that are simultaneously physically explicable and able to explain the distinctive 
epistemic gaps in the phenomenal domain" (Chalmers, 2010: 320). Further, if type-B physicalists 
accept horn A, then this would be a “kiss of death for physicalism” (Balog, 2012: 12). This is 
because physicalism maintains that consciousness is physical, non-phenomenal. Therefore, C 330 
must be cast in topic-neutral language. In order to defend his position, Chalmers develops what 
he calls his master argument. Chalmers (2006, 2010) argues that there is no account of C that 
can satisfy criterion (ii) and (iii). He asserts that we interpret thesis C either:  
1) Horn A: C is not physically explicable 
Or 335 
 
2) Horn B: C does not explain our epistemic situation with regards to consciousness 
(Chalmers, 2010: 312). 
Chalmers is asking us to approach this dilemma by conceiving of a p-zombie. The key question 
that Chalmers is asking us is can we conceive of p-zombies, i.e., beings that are functionally, 340 
physically, and psychologically identical to us, yet who lack the features of thesis C? 
Alternatively, one can approach the dilemma by considering functionally identical zombies, i.e., 
instead of having neurons these creatures have silicone chips and thus lack phenomenal 
consciousness. David Papineau (2006) tells us that a good majority of type-B physicalists assert 
that silicon zombies are a metaphysical possibility as well as a conceptual possibility, and that it 345 
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is epistemically possible that functional zombies lack consciousness (ibid.: 141). From here, one 
can ask whether functional zombies lack the features of thesis C. If we assert that functional 
zombies lack the features of thesis C, then we can be, for the most part, assured that p-zombies, 
too, will lack the features of thesis C. Either way, if we assert ‘yes’ that these entities lack the 
features of C, we will be saying that C is not physically explicable. By formulating the question 350 
this way, Chalmers is able to set up his master argument. While we are working our way through 
the master argument, we need to remember that only topic-neutral language is admitted because 
this language will not build in claims about the presence of phenomenal states or phenomenal 
concepts. The following shows the shape of Chalmers’ (2006) master argument: 
1) Horn A: If I can conceive of a p-zombie and she lacks C, then C is not physically 355 
explicable. 
2) Horn B: If I can conceive of a p-zombie and she does not lack C, then C cannot 
explain our epistemic situation. 
____________ 
3) Therefore: Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our 360 
epistemic situation (Chalmers, 2006: 174). 
This argument takes on the form of a dilemma. The structure of the dilemma is that for any 
reductive explanation of C, it is either entailed a priori by physical truths or it is not.  
5.2 The Fine Print: Insiders Scoop to Understanding Chalmers’ Conclusion 
 365 
To better understand how he arrives at his conclusion, Chalmers he tells us we need some further 
assumptions. He asserts that, as we work our way through his master argument, we are to assume 
that there is a “connection between conceivability and a certain sort of reductive explanation” 
(Chalmers, 2010: 313). Chalmers defines conceivability as: for any statement S, S is conceivable 
if and only if S cannot be ruled out a priori (Chalmers, 2006: 169). For Chalmers, if something is 370 
physically explicable, then it must have a reductive explanation in physical terms. A reductive 
explanation is an explanans that makes “transparent why some high-level truth obtains, given 
that certain low-level truths obtain. If it is conceivable that the low-level truths obtain without the 
high-level truths obtaining, then this sort of transparent explanation will fail” (Chalmers, 2010: 
313). Chalmers and Jackson (2001) assert that a necessary component of any reductive 375 
explanation in physical terms is the a priori entailment thesis. I will not lie out the structure of 
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the argument here; that is done in note (vi). What is important here is that we understand that 
Chalmers and Jackson argue that physicalists need to provide a transparent reductive explanation 
of why some phenomenal truth obtains given that some physical truth obtains. If it is conceivable 
that some physical truth obtains and some phenomenal truth does not obtain, then a reductive 380 
explanation cannot be given.  
5.2.1 Horn A of the Dilemma  
 
Now that we have seen the fine print, we are in a position to look at the individual horns of the 
dilemma. In this section, we look at horn A. In premise one—If I can conceive of a p-zombie and 385 
she lacks C, then C is not physically explicable—Chalmers is asking us if we can conceive of a 
p-zombie lacking C. If I answer ‘yes’, then I am asserting that C cannot be reductively explained. 
In other words, if I can conceive of a p-zombie and she lacks C, then physical facts do not entail 
C a priori. Therefore, according to Chalmers, if C resists a reductive explanation, then type-B 
physicalists cannot use C. 390 
  Conceiving of physical beings, such as p-zombies, lacking C parallels how we conceive 
of the physical facts obtaining and not phenomenal facts obtaining where we cannot provide a 
reductive explanation for the phenomenal. Therefore, we cannot give a reductive account of C. 
Thus, premise (1) obtains. I can say that if I can conceive of my p-zombie twin and that she lacks 
C, then a new gap emerges between the physical and C. If a new gap emerges, then we have no 395 
way to explain why it is we are in possession of C. From here, as explained by Sam Coleman 
(2009), it will be at least conceivable that there exist human beings who lack C, which we can 
label as C-zombies. In other terms, we lack a functional or physical account for why we have C, 
and we end up not with our original p-zombie but a C-zombie.  
5.2.2 Horn B of the Dilemma 400 
 
I have shown how Chalmers arrives at the conclusion that taking the first horn (A) of the 
dilemma does not help type-B physicalists. Let us now look at horn B: If I can conceive of a p-
zombie and she does not lack C, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation. Suppose that we 
cannot conceive of our p-zombie twin lacking C. We posit now that C must be reductively 405 
explicable (and so, my p-zombie twin will meet the criteria for C). If C is reductively explained, 
then C will fail to explain why we are faced with various distinctive epistemic gaps. What would 
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be the result of C explaining our epistemic situation? If C is able to reductively explain our 
epistemic situation, then my p-zombie twin is in possession of C and this would entail her being 
in possession of an epistemic situation like ours; thus my p-zombie twin would be confronted 410 
with her own version of an explanatory gap. Nevertheless, my p-zombie twin, according to 
Chalmers' intuition, cannot share my epistemic situation. His intuition is that since we have no 
way of accessing the content of a p-zombies beliefs', he imagines that these beliefs must be false 
or the justificatory strength of those beliefs is less than ours. We are forced to posit that p-
zombies satisfy C but do not satisfy the criteria for sharing our epistemic situation. To assert 415 
otherwise, we would once again face horn A of the dilemma. Thus, C is unable to reductively 
explain our epistemic situation. If this is true, then C is not able to explain the explanatory gap 
due to C’s inability to serve for our being in an epistemic situation i.e., if my p-zombie twin 
satisfies C, then C cannot include any phenomenal states. If we assume that our p-zombie twin 
shares our epistemic situation, then our epistemic situation has to involve something that is not 420 
understood topic-neutrally in thesis C. Ergo, according to Chalmers, we cannot posit that C 
reductively explains our epistemic situation, which renders premise (2) true. 
I have now shown how Chalmers arrives at the conclusion that taking the second horn of 
the dilemma does not help type-B physicalists, either. Chalmers’ master argument boils down to 
the claim that no explanation of C will be able to reductively explain our epistemic situation 425 
whilst simultaneously being explained by the physical. If we posit that the physical truths a 
priori entail C, our p-zombie twin will thus meet the criterion of C. Nevertheless, our p-zombie 
twin cannot meet the criterion of an epistemic situation, so C is incapable of explaining our 
epistemic situation. If we posit that C does entail a priori our epistemic situation, rendering our 
epistemic situation reductively explicable, my p-zombie twin does not meet the expectations of C 430 
for the reason that the physical truths do not a priori entail C, thus C is incapable of being 
reductively explained. According to Chalmers, PCS cannot provide an explanation of why we 
are confronted with the explanatory gap between the physical and phenomenal because the 
phenomenal concepts, that are to explain our epistemic situation, would themselves result in an 
explanatory gap. Therefore, Chalmers concludes that either C is reductively explicable or C fails 435 
to explain our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness.  
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5.3 Objections 
5.3.1 Horn A 
 
Type-B physicalists can object to Chalmers’ dilemma in several ways. First, regarding horn A, 440 
we can object to Chalmers definition of physically explicable. I agree with the type-B physicalist 
in denying that a reductive explanation must be knowable a priori. One can argue that a 
phenomenal property is explained by physical properties yet maintain that there still exists an 
explanatory gap between phenomenal and physical phenomena. For example, the facts about 
‘gas’ (low-level property) are not entailed a priori by C8H18 (high-level set of properties). It 445 
takes empirical science to show how gas and its chemical components are identical. Carruthers 
and Veillet (2007) tell us that type-B physicalists can argue that if there is an explanatory gap 
seen in general cases, then it is no wonder that we would expect to see these gaps concerning the 
psychophysical (ibid.: 232-3). From here, we can argue that due to these expected gaps one 
cannot assert that an ontological gap is imminent, providing we do not maintain that there are 450 
ontological gaps seen in low-level and high-level properties.  
 I agree with Josh Weisberg (2011) when he tells us that when one accepts any theory one 
understands that theories are matters of the empirical domain where questions are motivated by 
their hypothetical efficacy. The empirical and our mental concepts are intertwined in such a 
manner that they are impossible to separate. In other words, we do not have some privileged 455 
access that allows us to make “a priori judgements about concepts and modality” that are 
infallible (ibid.: 587). 
 Carruthers (2004) argues that for reductive explanations to be successful every question 
that perplexes us need to be answered in such a manner demonstrating why some facts appear in 
a perplexing way to us when in fact they are not, and all thickly individuated facts can be 460 
reductively explained.vii Further, he argues that one, in principle, cannot provide a reductive 
explanation for every thinly individuated fact because thinly individual facts number infinitely 
(ibid.: 167). Moreover, if Chalmers’ requirement is that all thinly individuated facts must admit 
of a reductive explanation, then, we can say that this request is irrational. In fact, this is just what 
Chalmers and Jackson (2001) require.   465 
5.3.2 Objections to Horn B 
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Concerning Chalmers’ assumption: (c) if p-zombies do not lack C and yet do not share our 
epistemic situation, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation. This conclusion follows from 
two other assumptions. First, (a) if I can imagine my p-zombie twin and it is inconceivable that 470 
she lacks C and it is conceivable that she lacks an epistemic situation, then it is conceivable that 
she possesses C and lacks an epistemic situation; and second, (b) it is conceivable I can imagine 
my p-zombie twin and she lacks an epistemic situation. This is conceivable only if we understand 
our epistemic situation as being cast in phenomenal language and your p-zombie twins’ 
epistemic situation is being cast in topic-neutral language, then C cannot explain our epistemic 475 
situation. It is here that Chalmers commits the fallacy of equivocation. If we remember, 
Chalmers (2010) explicitly noted that our epistemic situation ought to be conceptualized in topic-
neutral language so as not to build in phenomenal concepts or states (ibid.: 316). If our epistemic 
situation were defined in phenomenal language, not topic-neutrally, then Chalmers’ claim to (c) 
would be warranted. Therefore, C can explain our epistemic situation when we restrict both, C, 480 
and our epistemic situation to a topic-neutral understanding. For type-B physicalists can reject 
premise (b) (above) and argue that when our epistemic situation is understood in topic-neutral 
language, C will explain my epistemic situation along with my p-zombie twins’ epistemic 
situation. I hope to address this in § 8.  
6 Giving PCS the Kiss of Life 485 
 
Previously, I asserted that type-B physicalists could still use PCS even though Chalmers presents 
a seemingly compelling argument against it. My objection to Chalmers’ master argument is that 
even if we cannot give a reductive explanation of C, PCS will still be able to help the type-B 
physicalist by providing an explanation for why we are confronted with an explanatory gap. In 490 
this section, I reply to Chalmers’ objection to PCS (see page 16: 336). I will argue that when we 
cast C in topic-neutral language whilst casting our epistemic situation in phenomenal language, 
C can be reductively explained by the physical and C cannot reductively explain our epistemic 
situation. After presenting this argument, I will argue that when we cast C and our epistemic 
situation in phenomenal language, C will reductively explain our epistemic situation and C will 495 
not be reductively explained by the physical. While Chalmers is telling us how his master 
argument works, we are supposed to focus on his casting C and our epistemic situation in topic-
neutral language, eschewing all references to the phenomenal. I charge Chalmers with neglecting 
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to show what happens when one interprets C using both languages whilst maintaining our 
epistemic situation in phenomenal language. I hope to draw out the consequences that the 500 
property dualist faces upon accepting one or the other rendition of C. In section (8), I hope to 
argue that when C and our epistemic situation are cast in topic-neutral language that our p-
zombie twin does indeed share our epistemic situation. Together, these sections will result in a 
quandary: either our epistemic situation must be cast in phenomenal language or our epistemic 
situation must be cast in topic-neutral language. Chalmers does not have to accept the 505 
conclusions drawn from phase (1) of the quandary. If he chooses not to accept the conclusion, 
then he must accept that when our epistemic situation is cast in topic-neutral language our p-
zombie twin does indeed share our epistemic situation as delineated in section 8. Chalmers faces 
a fatal quandary. He cannot have it both ways. I will argue that accepting either understanding of 
our epistemic situation shows that a defender of PCS has a way of responding to Chalmers’ 510 
objection.  
6.1 My Reply to Chalmers’ Objection: Phase (1) of the Quandary 
 
According to Chalmers, if I accept that the physical truths explain C, I must accept the 
devastating consequence of C not explaining my epistemic situation. Below is the argument for 515 
how he arrives at such a conclusion: 
1) If the physical truths and not-C is inconceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic 
situation. 
2) The physical truths and not-C is not conceivable 
3) Therefore, the physical truths explain C, and C cannot explain our epistemic situation 520 
Suppose we cast C in topic-neutral language and cast our epistemic situation in phenomenal 
language. I can imagine my p-zombie twin and for me it will be inconceivable to imagine her 
lacking C. Indeed, I must imagine her in possession of C. After all, she is a functional, physical, 
and psychological duplicate of me, so it is conceivable that C does not a priori entail our 
epistemic situation. Now, I ought to be able to assert with confidence that the physical 525 
reductively explains C. Since I am confident that the physical will explain C, Chalmers tells me 
not to be so quick to celebrate, for C cannot provide an explanation of our epistemic situation, 
thus I have a problem (Chalmers, 2010). But, I do not see that I have a problem. The explanation 
I have just provided is indeed quite simple, and much more is involved when we try to meet 
IN DEFENSE OF THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPT STRATEGY 
 24 
Chalmers’ requirement for C to provide a reductive explanation of our epistemic situation whilst 530 
simultaneously being explained by the physical.  
 Let us take a closer look at the consequences when we argue that the physical does 
explain C and that C must explain our epistemic situation. When we cast our epistemic situation 
in phenomenal language, C can provide a reductive explanation of our epistemic situation if and 
only if C can provide a reductive explanation of phenomenal truths about consciousness. Another 535 
way of putting it: Suppose C is cast in topic-neutral language, and C explains our epistemic 
situation, we must be comfortable with asserting that C explains our epistemic situation only if 
the physical a priori entails the phenomenal. Thus, if it is conceivable for you that C reductively 
explains our epistemic situation, then it is conceivable for you that the physical reductively 
explains the phenomenal. However, some of us will not assent to this. Type-B physicalists argue 540 
PCS states that the physical does not entail a priori the phenomenal, i.e., the physical cannot 
reductively explain the phenomenal. Therefore, according to the type-B physicalist, C cannot 
reductively explain our epistemic situation when C is cast in topic-neutral language and our 
epistemic situation is cast in phenomenal language, and we see the explanatory gap, which is 
predicted by type-B physicalists, now between C and our epistemic situation.   545 
 Since the physical cannot reductively explain the phenomenal, according to type-B 
physicalists, the requirement that Chalmers places on PCS to provide a reductive explanation of 
our epistemic situation via C suggests that he has denied PCS before it has a chance to launch. In 
other terms, if C is cast in topic-neutral language and our epistemic situation is cast in 
phenomenal language, then Chalmers cannot request that C must explain our epistemic situation 550 
because such an explanation requires that we have a reductive explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness. Again, the intent of PCS is not to explain phenomenal consciousness, but to 
provide an explanation of why it is we are confronted with distinctive epistemic gaps consistent 
with physicalism.viii Chalmers’ main objection to PCS is intended to demonstrate reasons that 
PCS does not succeed; not to dismiss PCS before it launches. Expecting that PCS reductively 555 
explain consciousness is a rejection of PCS’s function from the very start and this shows that the 
property dualist is unwilling to meet the challenges of the argument on the ground that the 
argument was developed upon.    
 Now let us consider both C and our epistemic situation in phenomenal language. Let C* 
represent C as being cast in phenomenal language, therefore: 560 
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1) If the physical truths and not-C* is conceivable, then C* is not physically explicable. 
2) The physical truths and not-C* is conceivable 
3) Therefore, C* is not physically explicable.  
I am positing that C* can explain our epistemic situation, however, C* will not be physically 
explicable. Below, I explain why. 565 
 My explanation here will bear a similarity to the above explanation. In order for C to 
reductively explain our epistemic situation, C will necessarily a priori entail our epistemic 
situation, thus C and our epistemic situation must be cast in phenomenal language. Under the 
presupposition that C* is true, human beings must be phenomenally conscious. Chalmers 
requires that the physical truths must reductively explain why human beings are in possession of 570 
C*. Again, for C* to be reductively explained by the physical truths, the physical truths must 
reductively explain phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers’ requirement is now understood as the 
requirement that physical truths explain C*. This is to expect that the physical truths must a 
priori entail phenomenal truths. According to type-B physicalists, PCS is not intended to explain 
phenomenal consciousness. PCS is intended to explain why we are confronted with an 575 
explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal by explaining the conceptual isolation 
that holds between our physical and phenomenal concepts. Hence, Chalmers cannot require PCS 
to do a job it is not intended to do, (to provide a reductive explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness). Therefore, C* reductively explains our epistemic situation. On the other hand, 
the physical truths cannot reductively explain the phenomenal truths pertaining to consciousness. 580 
Ergo, the physical truths cannot reductively explain C* because to do so would require that the 
physical a priori entails the phenomenal. The question now becomes what can PCS do here.  
7 Objections 
 
In §4, I explained how Chalmers defines our epistemic situation. It may be the case that we can 585 
understand why we do not share our epistemic situation with our p-zombie twin, although it is 
hard to see why this would have an effect on PCS. The intent of PCS is to explain why there is 
an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal. The objective of PCS is not to 
elucidate our complete epistemic situation. As noted earlier, Chalmers (2010) writes: “…to 
undercut the inference from the epistemic gaps to an ontological gap, PCS has to show how the 590 
truth involving epistemic gaps are consistent with physicalism” (ibid.: 324). C will have to 
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provide some type of explanation of these truth-involving epistemic gaps. The epistemic gap 
between the physical and the phenomenal are truth involving according to the property dualist in 
that they are built into these epistemic gaps based upon a separation of and the truth of the 
physical and the phenomenal i.e., each is a distinct and true property. This creates a problem for 595 
the physicalist. For example, one cannot show arguments where only the physical and not-
phenomenal or not-physical and the phenomenal exist if the argument is a truth involving 
argument. Both the physical and the phenomenal have to be true in the argument. Therefore, 
failure to represent either the physical or the phenomenal as true in the epistemic arguments 
results in the physical or the phenomenal not being truth involving, hence, the epistemic 600 
arguments will not be truth involving. Furthermore, if the epistemic arguments are not truth 
involving, the property dualist cannot infer a truth involving ontological gap. Due to this, the 
property dualist asserts that to weaken the ontological gap, C needs to come up with a different 
way of explaining the truth involving epistemic gaps.  
 I suggest that requiring that C explain the truth involving gaps is far too strong. Our 605 
epistemic situation embraces our beliefs, to include our belief pertaining to consciousness, 
especially since this was hypothesized. Our beliefs about consciousness are not germane to the 
epistemic gaps we see. If our beliefs are not germane to the epistemic gaps, then C does not have 
to explain this. For example, I maintain that I am either a human being who is phenomenally 
conscious, or I am a p-zombie, a being that is not phenomenally conscious. This is a belief 610 
pertaining to my state of consciousness; thus, is to be part and parcel of my epistemic situation 
pertaining to consciousness. So now I would have to provide an explanation for why my holding 
that I am either a human being who is phenomenally conscious, or I am a p-zombie is true and is 
justified by the features it implies. Therefore, my explanation must contain facts about laws of 
logic. This then would result in C having to not only explain the truth-involving gaps, but also 615 
that C will have to explain laws of logic. Ergo, having C explain our complete epistemic 
situation is far too strong.  
 Furthermore, if our p-zombie twin meets the expectations of C, I am at a loss in seeing 
how this is a problem for our explanation of how it is that the truths pertaining to phenomenal 
consciousness is not a priori entailed by physical truths. The attempt to argue that our p-zombie 620 
twin poses an issue for how PCS is to explain phenomenal consciousness seems rather 
misleading. We know that our p-zombie twin has no way of inferring the truths about 
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phenomenal consciousness from the physical facts especially since she cannot even possibly 
understand phenomenal consciousness due to her lack of phenomenal concepts to extend to 
truths about phenomenal consciousness. I suggest that the first question the type-B physicalist 625 
ought to ask is why should C be required to explicate our epistemic situation concerning 
consciousness.  
 The property dualist can rebut phase (1) of the quandary by asserting this is not a 
conceivable possibility since we still see the lack of a reductive explanation and this lack of a 
reductive explanation does in fact a priori entail the existence of an ontological gap. Chalmers 630 
writes:  
[T]he strategy would help to justify the claim that the epistemic gap is compatible with 
ontological physicalism and so would lend significant support to type-B materialism. But 
the weaker version of the strategy outlined here can give no such support. On this 
version, the proponent needs independent grounds to reject the inference from an 635 
explanatory gap to an ontological gap (Chalmers, 2010: 322, emphasis original). 
Chalmers asserts that the above weaker version of PCS cannot justify an explanatory gap 
between the physical and the phenomenal truths that do not result in an ontological gap. To this, 
I respond by asserting that PCS does provide justification for why the explanatory gap does not 
result in an ontological gap. PCS can provide a reductive explanation by way of conceptual 640 
isolation. As noted earlier, our physical and phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated and 
cannot be known a priori. According to philosophers such as Stoljar, and Carruthers and Veillet, 
“Phenomenal truths are conceptually irreducible, i.e., there is no a priori entailment from the 
physical to the phenomenal” (Carruthers and Veillet, 2007: 2; Stoljar, 2005: 5). Geoffrey Lee 
(forthcoming) argues that it is “implausible that there is any a priori resolution available in the 645 
dispute between” the property dualist and the physicalist (ibid.: 16). Nevertheless, by providing a 
reductive explanation as to why these concepts are isolated from one another, PCS, even though 
admitting an explanatory gap, lends sustenance to type-B physicalism. 
  Furthermore, if we are to conceptualize our epistemic situation in phenomenal terms we 
see the predicted explanatory gap between C and our epistemic situation or between the physical 650 
and C. This gap is the same gap that we see between that of the physical and the phenomenal. In 
each case, we cannot provide a reductive explanation via phenomenal concepts of our epistemic 
situation. Papineau (2006) argues that type-B physicalists can argue that what explains the 
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explanatory gap is that our concepts of the physical or functional and the phenomenal, although 
conceptually isolated, have the ability to pick out physical states that are the same (ibid.: 141). 655 
PCS “shows that a purely physical world where the epistemic gaps are explained by the nature of 
phenomenal concepts—rather than by the nature of phenomenality itself—is conceivable” 
(Balog, 2012: 17, emphasis original). If our concepts pick out the same state, then the type-B 
physicalist can assert there does not exist an ontological gap in the face of an explanatory gap 
because there is no a priori entailment to dismiss a world where our phenomenal properties are 660 
identical to a physical or functional property. 
 Moreover, the type-B physicalist responds by asserting that this objection is just an 
objection to the theories that PCS is intended to debunk. In other words, the property dualist 
would be arguing that “phenomenal facts do not metaphysically supervene on the physical” 
(ibid.: 17). This argument is just a reiteration of what the property dualist previously 665 
concluded—the phenomenal facts do not metaphysically supervene upon the physical—
therefore, adds nothing to the current debate. A reiteration of this argument appears to be 
question begging. The explanatory gap seen between the physical facts and the phenomenal 
facts, and between the physical facts and C* exist due to the conceptual isolation of our 
phenomenal concepts from the physical. Thus we can argue that if conceptual isolation is 670 
admitted into the debate, the spuriousness of the property dualists theories—the theories that are 
intended to dispel conceptual isolation—the type-B physicalist can account for (ibid.: 17). If the 
property dualist wishes to resort to asserting that PCS is inconceivable upon the grounds of 
maintaining that their theory is the most correct theory, a theory that PCS is attempting to 
debunk, then the dualist does not show that PCS is refuted. Instead, the property dualist shows 675 
that she is unwilling to meet the challenges of the argument on the ground that the argument was 
developed upon.   
 One defending Chalmers might now object by saying that if PCS does provide an 
explanation for the explanatory gap in terms of conceptual isolation, an explanatory gap develops 
between the explanation of conceptual isolation and physical truths. Thus, type-B physicalists 680 
cannot use conceptual isolation to explain the gap between the physical and the phenomenal, the 
physical truths and C, and C and our epistemic situation. Ergo, the type-B physicalist must 
provide some type of a reductive explanation for the features that explain conceptual isolation. 
 Type-B physicalists respond to Chalmers’ objection by asserting that they are providing a 
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reductive account, or at least have begun to propose a reductive explanation for the features of 685 
conceptual isolation.ix Carruthers (2004) writes:  
Bundling these third-person characterizations into a third-person concept of phenomenal 
consciousness, we can then pick out each thickly individuated fact designated through the 
application of a purely recognitional concept by saying, ‘It is the phenomenally conscious 
state that he/she is introspectively recognizing right now’. The claim is that each such fact 690 
− together with the various puzzling properties that make up the third-person concept of 
phenomenal consciousness − can in principle receive a reductive explanation (ibid.: 167-8). 
On Carruthers account, he notes that our first-person phenomenal concepts can be characterised 
into our third-personal terms which will be available to ‘introspective recognition’ (ibid.: 167). 
Most people will then maintain that these properties are, following Dennett (1991), ineffable, and 695 
private. Further, many will assert they have privileged access to these properties via 
introspection thus resulting in privileged knowledge of these properties. Therefore, we can say 
that first-person recognitional concepts that pick out properties are the same properties that are 
picked out by our third-personal concepts. If we want a successful explanation of these 
properties, then a reductive explanation will primarily be concerned with the third-personal 700 
features of our concepts. If we can provide a reductive account of our third-personal concepts, 
then we may be in a position to hold the view that phenomenal consciousness has been explained 
(Carruthers, 2004: 169). 
 Loar also provides a theory of how a reductive account of conceptual isolation can be 
interpreted. Loar (2007) writes: 705 
…[B]eing a posteriori is not a modal-semantic property but a psychological-cognitive 
property, or, to put it another way, a matter of conceptual role. The conceptual role of the 
phenomenal concept feeling like that, and the conceptual role of the verbal-theoretical 
concept of C-fiber stimulation, are conceptually independent. That is all one needs to 
explain the a posteriori status of the identity. The phenomenal concept of feeling pain and 710 
the theoretical concept of C-fiber stimulation are such empirically independent sorts of 
concepts that the metaphysics of their references are, on the face of it, beside the point. 
Even if two such concepts connote the same mode of presentation, that is, a certain 
property, there is no reason to suppose that those concepts should thereby be connected a 
priori (ibid.: 452-3). 715 
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On Loar’s account, the conceptual isolation that holds between the physical and the phenomenal 
is the matter of a conceptual role. Conceptual isolation can be explained by the psychological-
cognitive roles. If this is true, then conceptual isolation can be reductively explained in physical 
terms. A physicalists’ notion of ‘C-fiber stimulation’ is conceptually connected to the cognitive 
role within our language centres. Our phenomenal concept of ‘pain’ is conceptually connected to 720 
our understanding of the roles that our neurons play. Therefore, if the physical truths obtain, then 
conceptual isolation must be true since a physicalist can provide a reductive explanation for the 
features of conceptual isolation.  
 Now, one might try to defend Chalmers by asserting that conceptual isolation cannot be 
reductively explained, however, Chalmers (2010: 325) has recently admitted that conceptual 725 
isolation can be reductively explained. Chalmers, whilst arguing against PCS, notes that the 
beliefs a p-zombie has are not conceptually connected and that it is possible for a type-B 
physicalist, by way of conceptual isolation, to provide a reductive explanation of the gaps seen 
between the physical and C, C and our epistemic situation, and the physical and the phenomenal. 
If a p-zombies’ physical and quasi-phenomenal beliefs share the same features of conceptual 730 
isolation as do our physical and phenomenal beliefs, and since Chalmers admits that a 
characteristic of phenomenal concepts is conceptual isolation that can be reductively explained, 
then Chalmers has to admit that conceptual isolation is independent of phenomenal experience. 
In other terms, my p-zombie twin, who lacks phenomenal consciousness, nonetheless, too, (to 
use Chalmers’ 1996 vocabulary) “suffers” under the conceptual isolation that is found between 735 
her physical and quasi-phenomenal beliefs; thus, this shows that one does not need phenomenal 
experience for conceptual isolation to be found amongst our concepts. If this is true, then 
Chalmers’ request that PCS needs to reductively explain conceptual isolation is met because PCS 
can provide a psychological-cognitive explanation for why our phenomenal concepts are 
conceptually isolated. In both Carruthers’ and Loar’s accounts we see that PCS provides a 740 
reductive explanation of the explanatory gap by way of a psychological-cognitive explanation. 
Conceptual isolation accounts for the gap we see between the physical and the phenomenal, and 
the gaps seen between the physical and C, and C and our epistemic situation.  
Phase (1) Complete 
Synopsis 745 
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I have argued that Chalmers’ argument establishes two things: (a) a gap is seen between C and 
the physical truths when C is cast in phenomenal language, and (b) a gap is seen between C and 
our epistemic situation when C is cast in topic-neutral language. These gaps parallel the gap we 
see between the physical and the phenomenal where the phenomenal property is being 750 
conceptualized by phenomenal concepts and this results in our inability to provide a reductive 
explanation. Nevertheless, the proponents of PCS can accept both of these consequences. Type-
B physicalists maintain that whether C is cast phenomenally or topic-neutrally, C is understood 
such that our phenomenal concepts express properties that are identical with the properties that 
are expressed by certain physical concepts (Loar, 1999: 467) in the sense that, although 755 
admitting to an explanatory gap, there does not exist an ontological gap. Phase (1) of the 
quandary remains conceivable even if the physical truths will not explain C. Balog (2012) writes: 
“Even if the world is entirely physical, as a consequence of the unique cognitive profile of 
phenomenal concepts, the puzzling epistemic gaps still have to arise” (ibid.: 17). Therefore, 
according to type-B physicalists there is no a priori reason in the vicinity to discount phase (1) of 760 
the quandary. When our epistemic situation is cast in phenomenal language, we see that the 
debate between the type-B physicalist and the property dualist does not further their positions; it 
simply extends the explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal to explanatory 
gaps between the physical and C*, and C and our epistemic situation, and a reductive 
explanation is not possible. Ultimately, both the master argument and phase (1) presented here 765 
succeed in showing that there is an explanatory gap but this does not show that we must 
conclude there is a resultant ontological gap. Chalmers begs the question against type-B 
physicalism by asserting that our conceptually isolated concepts must necessarily express an 
ontologically distinct property. Further, Chalmers begs the question against type-B physicalism 
by asserting that only a reductive explanation is acceptable.  770 
8 Epistemic Egalitarianism for My P-Zombie Twin 
8.1 Phase (2) of the Quandary: Casting Our Epistemic Situation in Topic-Neutral 
Language 
 
In the previous section, I argued that when we cast our epistemic situation in phenomenal terms, 775 
the physical truths reductively explain C, or C reductively explains our epistemic situation. Here, 
I want to argue that we have reasons to call into question our intuition that consciousness must 
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be ontologically distinct from our epistemic situation. Some property dualists argue that my p-
zombie twin lacks phenomenal consciousness due to her brain not being wired the way my brain 
is, i.e., all of our brain functions and psychologies are identical, but she is missing the 780 
phenomenal property qualia that I possess. This is not to affirm that our p-zombie twin is 
functionally, physically, and psychologically different than us as we know ex hypothesi she is 
identical to us in those respects. Her internal states play analogous roles to our internal states. If 
we assert that we form trustworthy conceptual images of our surrounding location, then so will 
our p-zombie twin. I will argue against the property dualists’ assertions that if my p-zombie twin 785 
is missing phenomenal consciousness that her epistemic situation will be different from ours. I 
will cast our epistemic situation in topic-neutral language (third-person language). I intend to 
argue contra Chalmers that my p-zombie twin and me will be in equally good epistemic 
situations. If I am successful, then this, too, will debunk one of the ways that property dualists 
argue that an ontological gap is generated by an epistemic gap.   790 
 Let me begin by presenting an intuition pump that seems to make it clear why we have 
intuitions about phenomenal consciousness as being an ontologically distinct property. One of 
the better intuition pumps found in recent literature comes from Barry Dainton (2008: § 6.5). 
Dainton’s intuition pump looks at the link between phenomenal consciousness and the 
psychological features of character. His intuition pump concerns pre-neuron replacement therapy 795 
(NRT) Tom and post-NRT Tom. Tom’s biological neurons will be replaced with silicon, i.e., he 
will no longer have a carbon-based brain like ours but will have a silicon-based brain. In what 
follows, I briefly sketch the idea conveyed in the intuition pump: 
Suppose Tom has a deadly form of brain cancer and his neurologist has told him that a 
procedure called NRT will eradicate his brain cancer (this procedure will also aide people 800 
with other degenerative neuronal associated diseases where death is not so readily in 
one’s future). Tom is told that the process is simple and he can remain conscious during 
the whole thing. Tom opts for the procedure. During the operation, he notices no changes 
to what he experiences. Post-NRT Tom asserts that he is unable to detect any intellectual, 
personality, psychological, or behavioural changes.  805 
Would you, if faced with something similar to Tom’s situation, opt in for NRT? Dainton says, 
and I concur that most would sign up. Imagine, for instance, that your best friend’s mom had 
some type of degenerative neuronal disease and she had the operation, without any noticeable 
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complications. The personality and intellect of those who received NRT is unaltered, as far as 
anyone is able to tell. However, we will be faced with those who are very critical about NRT due 810 
to the replacement of the biological neurons with silicon neurons. These critics will argue that 
although there are no noticeable differences in the psychological functioning and behaviour of 
those who received NRT, it is conceivable to infer that these recipients, such as Tom, have 
become zombified and are now walking functional silicon zombies. These walking functional 
silicon zombies would be able to report that they feel pain when they slam their fingers in a car 815 
door, but they will not truly feel pain because for them ‘all is dark inside’ (Chalmers, 2010: 318) 
due to their now lacking phenomenal consciousness. Knowing this objection, would you opt in 
for the NRT procedure? Probably not: We tend to have the intuition that having phenomenal 
consciousness is a key ingredient for the richness of our lives. Our intuition concerning post-
NRT Tom is that he is missing phenomenal consciousness, and thus he cannot experience life in 820 
the same manner as we do. Post-NRT Tom just does not realize his life has lost a key ingredient 
that provides his life with all its richness.  
 What if our reasoning and intuitions are incorrect, though? Since we are not in possession 
of a consciousness detector, a device that is used to detect the existence of experience in a being, 
we are forced to infer or argue that post NRT-Tom is without phenomenal consciousness due to 825 
his biological neurons being replaced with silicon neurons. Therefore, based upon these 
inferences and arguments against NRT, some people may decide against opting in for the NRT 
procedure even though there are no noticeable differences between beings who have undergone 
NRT and those who have not. 
 Although it is inferred that NRT eradicates phenomenal consciousness, let us stipulate that 830 
NRT dramatically enhances functional capacity, such as answering a mathematical equation 
quicker. Would this still allow the critics to deny that post-NRT Tom, lacking phenomenal 
consciousness yet an entirely causal-functional being, has a kind of consciousness?  
 One might argue that we would have grounds to answer this question with a ‘Yes’. You 
think it is at least a possibility that post-NRT Tom has been zombified. Nevertheless, you sit 835 
back and think about your past experiences with Tom prior to his NRT, and currently you and 
Tom enjoy your time spent together discussing, say, the differences between dualism and 
physicalism. Tom does not appear to lack his sense of humour, his likes and dislikes are just as 
they were before, and his card playing ability is still horrible (much to your relief) despite the 
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fact that his biological neurons have been replaced with silicon. No matter the amount of nagging 840 
you do to convince post-NRT Tom that he has been zombified, he disagrees with you and 
maintains that his inner states are every bit as rich as yours are. Post-NRT Tom’s psychological 
states are the same as pre-NRT Tom’s. Thus, we could speculate that a being that is in 
possession of psychological/functional states is in possession of a kind of consciousness. As Lee 
tells us, zombies “could be equally justified in their beliefs, and equally acquainted with their 845 
environment” (Lee, forthcoming: 4). Hence, functional silicon zombie states are as rich as our 
states. From here, we can infer that these functional silicon zombies share in our epistemic 
situation. That is, functional silicon zombies have it just as good as we have it. If this is the case 
then there is no reason not to opt in for NRT. Therefore, functional silicon zombies might very 
well share our epistemic situation via their possession of a kind of consciousness.  850 
 Some can argue that maybe there is an issue in Dainton’s intuition pump. The issue is that 
we have to infer the existence of consciousness in another, rather than it being stipulated that 
they lack consciousness. Using functional silicon zombies to argue for the existence of an 
ontological gap between the physical and the phenomenal would pose problems for Chalmers 
because it is not explicitly stipulated that these creatures are not in possession of qualia whereas 855 
with p-zombies this is explicitly stipulated. The explicit stipulation that p-zombies lack qualia 
allows Chalmers to argue that PCS is doomed to fail and for the existence of an ontological gap. 
So, to avoid the issue of inference, let us look at a more traditional case where we imagine our 
Tom scenario a bit differently. Let us imagine Tom living here on planet Earth, and Zombie-Tom 
is Tom’s counterpart living on planet Zombie (everyone on planet Zombie is a zombie and this 860 
planet is identical to planet Earth). Chalmers defines our p-zombie twin as having psychological 
states; therefore, he accepts that Zombie-Tom does have functional consciousness. Chalmers 
(1996) describes our p-zombie twin as:  
…psychologically identical to me. He will perceive, in the functional sense, and tasting 
the chocolate, in the psychological sense. All of this follows logically from the fact that 865 
he is physically identical to me, by virtue of the functional analyses of psychological 
notions. He will even be ''conscious" in the functional senses—he will be awake, able to 
report the contents of his internal states, able to focus attention in various places, and so 
on (ibid.: 96).  
Tom and his counterpart Zombie-Tom live analogous lives, or as analogous as can be since one 870 
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has phenomenal consciousness and the other does not. Zombie-Tom does not possess 
phenomenal consciousness, thus his mind will be lacking compared to his counterpart Tom. That 
is, we understand Zombie-Tom’s mind as having only non-phenomenal features. Zombie-Tom’s 
mental states are completely non-experiential; thus, the non-phenomenal features of his mind 
leave out nothing in the sense that we can describe Zombie-Tom’s mentality from a functional, 875 
psychological position. In other terms, in order to provide a full account of Zombie-Tom’s 
mentality we can only speak from a third-person perspective. Contrarily, we cannot say this 
about Tom. We cannot characterise Tom’s mind as possessing only non-phenomenal features as 
we know Tom possesses phenomenal consciousness; thus, in order to provide a full description 
of Tom’s mentality we speak from both a first-personal and third-personal position. Be that as it 880 
may, whilst the mind of Tom and Zombie-Tom are very different, we can see in some sense that 
their minds are identical. “For every occurrent and dispositional mental state Tom has at a given 
time, there is a corresponding state belonging to Zombie-Tom” (Dainton, 2008: 184). Suppose 
Tom has some mental state, h, at time t. Then Zombie-Tom will have a state h* at t, and h and h* 
will have the same non-phenomenal features. For example, imagine Tom is viewing the Mona 885 
Lisa. He will be experiencing a complex visual experience. Meanwhile, back on planet Zombie, 
Zombie-Tom, too, is viewing the identical Mona Lisa. Zombie-Tom will be able to describe the 
painting in exactly the same ways that Tom will describe it, right down to the complexity of 
colours. If Tom makes judgements pertaining to his experience, Zombie-Tom will also. If 
Zombie-Tom wonders, ‘Would my experience of these colours, the brilliant blues, be as rich if 890 
the lighting where softer?’ Tom would wonder the identical thought. The difference here is that 
Tom is having a phenomenal visual experience: Zombie-Tom is not since he lacks phenomenal 
features. If this is true, then just what is Zombie-Tom talking about?  
 I claim that it is conceivable that, given all of Zombie-Tom’s current behaviours, he, too, 
can refer to his internal mental states. Chalmers (1996) agrees with my claim as noted in the 895 
passage that Zombie-Tom will be “able to report the contents of his internal states” (ibid.: 96). 
Therefore, Zombie-Tom is making reference to his internal, non-phenomenal state that viewing 
the Mona Lisa has caused in his perceptual apparatus; a state which he deploys the words 
‘brilliant blues’ to describe. Contrary to what Zombie-Tom might believe, he is having a non-
phenomenal experience: Tom is having a phenomenal experience, and for every phenomenal 900 
experience Tom has, Zombie-Tom has a non-phenomenal experience. For each belief that Tom 
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has, Zombie-Tom will have the same non-phenomenal belief. Whatever kind of psychological 
state that Tom has, there will be a non-phenomenal analogue in Zombie-Tom’s mind. In other 
terms, we can say that every experience, non-phenomenal and sensory, will have a functional 
role that will be exactly identical for both Tom and Zombie-Tom that pertains to occurrent states 905 
and this is not limited to just beliefs but to include each and every other type of “psychological 
state and ability” (Dainton, 2008:185). We do not need to be phenomenally conscious to perform 
various mental acts such as playing cards, solving mathematical equations, organizing objects 
from smallest to largest, etc. I think we can say the same applies to propositional attitudes and 
that our p-zombie twin can be in possession of propositional attitudes with content analogous to 910 
ours. 
 What Chalmers can and does deny is that Zombie-Tom and post-NRT Tom can have 
conscious experience. Neither Zombie-Tom nor post-NRT Tom can ever be in possession of 
experience in the sense that they can experience the content of their psychological states. Most of 
us would, too, deny that Zombie-Tom could have a rich psychological experience. Our denial of 915 
Zombie-Tom having rich psychological experiences stems from our intuitions that raw 
sensations provide us with the rich content of our psychological experiences and without these 
raw sensations, our experiences may feel hollow. However, one can posit that consciousness can 
be ‘weakly’ defined as a psychological state as opposed to a strong definition that consciousness 
must be said to include the phenomenal. If you adhere to the weak definition, then as you think 920 
about your now zombified friend Tom or your p-zombie twin, the memories he shares with you, 
the knowledge he has about so many different topics, etc., it seems obvious to you that he does 
indeed have a consciousness. You will arrive at this conclusion because you are unable to detect 
any differences in his psychology, personality, or other occurrent behaviours.   
 We all have various attitudes, beliefs, desires, etc., and it is conceivable that any typical 925 
attitude has a couple of features: propositional/ representational content where the content plays 
a functional role. It is conceivable that Zombie-Tom, lacking phenomenal consciousness, can 
have “contentful representations” of his world (ibid.: 186). Imagine, if you will, that you are 
being chased by an axe-wielding maniac who intends to hack you to bits. You have managed, by 
the hair of your chin, to avoid several very close calls by ducking into narrow alleyways, 930 
zigzagging between parked cars, running in front of on coming buses etc. You would be certain 
that your ‘would be’ attacker is functioning in the same capacity as you, in that she possesses 
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everything you possess mentally and in the current situation you are justified in your belief. After 
all, we believe that the desire to murder someone is usually driven by raw emotion. You would 
try to think of what you might have done or said to the axe-wielding maniac to cause her to hate 935 
you so much that she wants you dead. Now suppose that I am running along side of you. I inform 
you that your ‘would be’ attacker is a p-zombie. You would probably look at me and tell me that 
I must be as crazy as the axe-wielding maniac since we know that p-zombies do not possess 
qualia and thus cannot possess the raw emotion of hatred that is driving her to want you dead. 
Therefore, you would conclude that the axe-wielding maniac could not be a p-zombie. The 940 
prospect that your ‘would be’ attacker is functioning without some type of contentful 
representation of you and your surroundings would not seem true to you because there must be 
some raw emotion that she possesses, otherwise she would not be hunting you down and trying 
to kill you.  
 However, one could argue that the features of attitudes are non-phenomenal. We use 945 
propositional attitudes to provide some type of explanation for why someone is acting in such-
and-such a manner. As Chalmers (1996) notes the functional analysis of beliefs “captures much 
of what is significant about belief. It is related to the idea that belief is something of an 
explanatory construct: we attribute beliefs to others largely in order to explain their behaviour” 
(ibid.: 19, emphasis original). Zombie-Tom’s non-phenomenal attitudes suffice to explain his 950 
behaviour. Suppose Zombie-Tom really wants to purchase a bushel of Lambruscos, so he makes 
a substantial bet on California Chrome to win the 2015 Kentucky Derby, because he believes that 
the odds are favourable. Zombie-Toms’ beliefs and wants are non-phenomenal and this does not 
infringe upon their explanatory power. The explanatory power of propositional attitudes is 
extremely important and non-phenomenal attitudes possess almost as much as phenomenal 955 
attitudes (Dainton, 2008: 186).  
 Suppose that Tom and Zombie-Tom are viewing the Mona Lisa for the first time. Let us 
consider Tom’s epistemic situation. Chalmers will argue: 
Mary gains cognitively significant knowledge of what it is like to see red, knowledge that 
could not be inferred from physical knowledge. What about Mary’s zombie twin, 960 
Zombie-Mary? What sort of knowledge does Zombie-Mary gain when she emerges from 
the black-and-white room?...There is no reason to believe that Zombie-Mary will gain 
cognitively significant introspective knowledge analogous to the cognitively significant 
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knowledge that Mary gains. On the face of it, there is nothing for Zombie-Mary to gain 
knowledge of. For Zombie-Mary, all is dark inside, so even confronting her with a new 965 
sort of stimulus will not bring about new significant introspective knowledge (Chalmers, 
2010: 318).  
Let us relate this passage to Tom and Zombie-Tom upon seeing the Mona Lisa. In this passage, 
Chalmers argues that Tom’s epistemic situation is different from Zombie-Tom’s epistemic 
situation, but only with respect to Tom’s gaining cognitively significant knowledge of what it is 970 
like to see the Mona Lisa for the first time. In this passage, some will be inclined to understand 
Chalmers as asserting that the notion of ‘cognitive significance’, which is part of his definition of 
epistemic situation, is a product of how an agent has arrived at justified beliefs and can come to 
know certain pieces of information. Chalmers appears to have made it clear in the passage that 
cognitive knowledge must include introspective knowledge. Therefore, an agent will come into 975 
possession of cognitively significant knowledge of what it is like to experience the Mona Lisa 
only if that agent is in a position to have an experience of the Mona Lisa and that agent has 
phenomenal awareness of that experience, i.e., one must stand in a direct acquaintance 
relationship.  
 It appears to me that Chalmers is wanting to force us to accept the reason that Zombie-980 
Tom does not obtain cognitively significant knowledge is because he lacks what Tom has—
phenomenal consciousness—so his epistemic situation will be different from Tom’s. However, 
one can understand the difference in epistemic situations only if one assumes that Tom’s 
epistemic situation must involve the phenomenal. I argue that Chalmers has illicitly changed the 
meaning of ‘epistemic situation’. Let me explain why I make this claim. Chalmers’ argument is 985 
that (a) either we can conceive of Zombie-Tom lacking phenomenal consciousness or that we 
cannot conceive of him lacking phenomenal consciousness. (b) If we can conceive of Zombie-
Tom lacking phenomenal consciousness, then there exists a new explanatory gap and 
phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained by PCS. (c) If we cannot conceive of Zombie-
Tom lacking phenomenal consciousness, then PCS cannot explain the explanatory gap. (d) 990 
Therefore, either phenomenal consciousness is not physically explicable or the explanatory gap 
cannot be explained by PCS. All of the premises appear true and therefore, it appears that the 
conclusion must follow. However, is this argument valid? 
 Once we start critically analyzing the argument, we notice a few problems. First, premise 
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(a); the term ‘phenomenal consciousness’ must be univocal. Second, premise (b); phenomenal 995 
consciousness must be understood in phenomenal language (first-person language), i.e., if I can 
conceive of Zombie-Tom lacking phenomenal consciousness, then he lacks something Tom is 
intimately connected with (Tom’s first-personal awareness of being phenomenally conscious). 
Third, premise (c); phenomenal consciousness must be understood in topic-neutral language 
(third-person language), i.e., Tom and Zombie-Tom both possess functional, physical, and 1000 
psychological properties allowing both of them to express concepts when they stand in an 
acquaintance relationship with some experience. If this interpretation is correct, then in 
Chalmers’ argument, he commits the fallacy of equivocation. Even if I substitute phenomenal 
consciousness with cognitive introspective knowledge, or epistemic situation, the fallacy of 
equivocation will still be apparent.    1005 
 Nevertheless, let me again make it clear that we are supposed to understand our epistemic 
situation in topic-neutral language (third-person language) eschewing all reference to 
phenomenal states and concepts (first-person language). By bringing up the phenomenal and 
arguing that the epistemic situations cannot be the same due to a lack of phenomenal 
consciousness, Chalmers is not arguing on the ground rules imposed by PCS. In other words, he 1010 
has illicitly changed the meaning from a topic-neutral understanding of our epistemic situation to 
a phenomenal (first-person) understanding in an attempt to show his conclusion—p-zombie’s 
cannot share in our epistemic situation—is the most plausible position to maintain. However, a 
topic-neutral understanding not only applies to Zombie-Tom, but must also apply to Tom. 
Saying that Zombie-Tom cannot obtain cognitively significant knowledge because all is dark 1015 
inside is to forget that Zombie-Tom does have a psychological functional consciousness where 
he can form non-phenomenal beliefs, and as we shall see shortly, Chalmers will agree. Hence, I 
cannot accept that the epistemic situation between that of Tom and that of Zombie-Tom are 
different. Ergo, if Tom’s epistemic situation and Zombie-Tom’s epistemic situation are 
understood strictly in topic-neutral language, then Zombie-Tom satisfies the criteria for sharing 1020 
Tom’s epistemic situation.  
 Chalmers (2010) has foreseen this type of response and writes that one can assert that our 
p-zombie twin does share our epistemic situation. That is, Chalmers notes that I could assert that 
any belief that I have pertaining to consciousness, my p-zombie twin will “have corresponding 
beliefs with the same truth-values and epistemic status” (ibid.: 326). So, where Tom acquires 1025 
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new phenomenal knowledge upon seeing the Mona Lisa for the first time, Zombie-Tom acquires 
new knowledge of a precisely analogous sort. Chalmers writes: “If this is right, then the crucial 
features of phenomenal concepts might simultaneously be physically explicable and able to 
explain our epistemic situation” (Chalmers, 2010: 326).  
 However, Chalmers is quick to point out that our p-zombies beliefs’ will not be 1030 
phenomenal beliefs and Zombie-Tom’s knowledge will not be phenomenal knowledge since for 
p-zombies it is all dark inside and thus they cannot “have true beliefs that attribute phenomenal 
states to themselves” (ibid.: 326). Chalmers says that type-B physicalists have to conceive of p-
zombies as attributing some different type of state to him or herself: schmenomenal states and 
corresponding beliefs will be schmenomenal beliefs (ibid.: 326). Schmenomenal states stand to 1035 
phenomenal states similarly to the way Saul Kripke’s (1972) liquid ‘XYZ’ (on Twin Earth this 
liquid is identical-looking to the liquid on planet Earth, except this identical-looking substance is 
not H20, but is XYZ) stands in relation to water. “Schmenomenal states are not phenomenal 
states, but they play a role in zombies’ lives that is analogous to the role that phenomenal states 
play in ours” (Chalmers, 2010: 326). Hence, my p-zombie twins’ schmenomenal beliefs have the 1040 
same truth-value and epistemic status as mine. This idea will also apply to functional silicon 
zombies in that they will have “schmenomenal knowledge that is epistemically analogous to 
humans’ phenomenal knowledge” (ibid.: 327). 
 One defending Chalmers may argue that the content of Tom and Zombie-Tom’s 
epistemic situation will be different; therefore, they cannot share an epistemic situation. It is 1045 
interesting to note Chalmers position on the ‘content’ of beliefs as they pertain to both Tom and 
Zombie-Tom. Chalmers writes: 
[C]orresponding utterances by a conscious being and its zombie twin will express 
corresponding beliefs. It is important to note that this notion of correspondence does not 
require that corresponding beliefs have the same content. It is plausible that a non-1050 
conscious being such as a zombie cannot have beliefs with exactly the same content as 
our beliefs about consciousness. We can nevertheless talk of the zombie’s corresponding 
beliefs. So, the claim that a zombie and a conscious being share their epistemic situation 
does not require that their beliefs have the same content. This mirrors the general 
requirement that epistemic situations be understood in topic-neutral terms (Chalmers, 1055 
2010: 316). 
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Tom and Zombie-Tom share an epistemic situation even though the content of their beliefs are 
different. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) argue that Tom’s phenomenal concepts have the content 
of phenomenal states, and he is in possession of those states. Zombie-Tom’s schmenomenal 
concepts have schmenomenal states as its content. When Zombie-Tom asserts that he is 1060 
conscious, he is referring to his schmenomenal states, and he is in possession of those states 
(ibid.: 123). Therefore, Tom and Zombie-Tom’s beliefs are true and have justificatory strength in 
analogous ways, i.e., they share an epistemic situation even if there is a difference in what their 
beliefs are about. 
 Chalmers (2010) writes that one can defend Zombie-Tom and Tom sharing an epistemic 1065 
situation by either “deflating phenomenal knowledge of conscious beings or by inflating the 
corresponding knowledge of our p-zombie twin” (ibid.: 327). He points out that each strategy has 
its downfall. If we inflate Zombie-Tom’s epistemic gain, then we are forced to maintain that 
Zombie-Tom gains analogous cognitively significant knowledge that involves schmenomenal 
concepts as Tom gains involving phenomenal concepts. For example, when Tom gains 1070 
significant knowledge of the form vegemite “causes such-and-such phenomenal state, I am in 
such-and-such phenomenal state, and this is such-and-such phenomenal state” (ibid.: 328), 
Zombie-Tom gains significant knowledge of the same form just not with phenomenal states but 
with schmenomenal states. Therefore, on the inflationary strategy we have to say that Zombie-
Tom’s new beliefs have the same epistemic status and truth-value as Tom’s corresponding 1075 
beliefs. Chalmers rejects the inflationary strategy. 
 Chalmers gives two reasons for rejecting this inflationary strategy. First, he writes that if 
we accept this strategy, we are misconstruing what it is we are conceiving of when we conceive 
of p-zombies. He writes that we are not to be conceiving of these creatures with “something 
analogous to consciousness that is epistemically just as good, rather we ought to conceive of 1080 
them with nothing epistemically analogous to consciousness” (Chalmers, 2010: 328). If we are 
conceiving of p-zombies correctly, then Chalmers tells us that we are conceiving of creatures 
whose inner life is not as rich as ours, but that their inner life is dramatically poorer than our 
own. He tells us that the difference of inner lives creates a drastic difference in the richness of 
introspective knowledge (ibid.: 328). Secondly, Chalmers asserts that since we have “substantial 1085 
knowledge of our phenomenal lives that p-zombies can have no such analogous introspective 
knowledge because there is nothing analogous for them to have introspective knowledge of” 
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(ibid.: 328). I think Chalmers is mistaken in both his reasons for rejecting the inflationary 
strategy.  
 Let me consider Chalmers’ first reason for rejecting this inflationary strategy. When we 1090 
imagine our p-zombie twin, we are not imagining her as being in possession of anything that is 
phenomenally as good as we have it. However, we can imagine her as possessing something that 
is epistemically just as good since p-zombies do possess functional psychological consciousness 
that plays an analogous role to our lives.  
 Chalmers admits that it is conceivable for a p-zombie to have a sort of introspective 1095 
knowledge pertaining to its states such as propositional attitudes, or representational content, 
however, this type of introspective knowledge cannot be considered analogous to our 
phenomenal introspective knowledge. Rather, this sort of introspective knowledge is analogous 
to, as Dainton (2008) explains, our non-phenomenal introspective knowledge. Chalmers writes: 
 “Phenomenology is not all that is available to introspection, and it is not out of the 1100 
question that zombies could have the sort of non-phenomenal introspective knowledge 
that we have. But none of this knowledge will have the character of our introspective 
knowledge of phenomenal states because there is nothing analogous for zombies to 
introspect” (Chalmers, 2010: 328-9).  
Chalmers does assert it is conceivable that these creatures could have something analogous to 1105 
our conscious states, schmonsciousness, through which they will have analogous introspective 
knowledge. If this is conceivable, then it is also conceivable that our p-zombie twin would have 
no such “analogous introspective knowledge, and this latter conceivability claim is all that the 
argument against PCS needs” (ibid.: 329). Hence, if it is conceivable that my p-zombie twin 
lacks analogous introspective knowledge, even when Chalmers’ is arguing that our p-zombie 1110 
twin cannot share our epistemic situation, this is suppose to show that our conceptually isolated 
concepts and PCS cannot provide a reductive explanation for why it is we have introspective 
knowledge.  
 From my understanding of the above passage, Chalmers is equivocating upon our 
introspective knowledge, thus I disagree with his argument. Let me explain. First, Chalmers is 1115 
claiming that even if our p-zombie twin is in possession of C it is conceivable that: (a) my p-
zombie twin does not have the same type of introspective knowledge I have, and (b) we are 
incapable of securing the content of introspective knowledge using a topic-neutral language. 
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That is, if we understand our type of introspective knowledge as possessing phenomenal 
properties, then our p-zombie twin must lack this type of knowledge (first-personally 1120 
understood). If our p-zombie twin does indeed lack our phenomenal introspective knowledge, 
then we are unable to provide an explanation for the content of our introspective knowledge in 
topic-neutral language. This leads Chalmers to conclude that our p-zombie twin cannot share our 
epistemic situation. However—and this is a crucial point—if introspective knowledge is part of 
our epistemic situation, and we are casting our epistemic situation in topic-neutral language, then 1125 
the content of introspective knowledge is expressible in topic-neutral language. Since it is 
expressible in topic-neutral language PCS can provide an explanation of our epistemic situation 
by arguing for the conceptual isolation that holds between our concepts and that the content of 
our p-zombie twins’ knowledge is different. Therefore, type-B physicalists can deny the 
existence of an ontological gap. Thus, I do not accept stipulation (b). By not accepting stipulation 1130 
(b) I, therefore, deny that our p-zombie twin does not share our epistemic situation.  
 Now let us consider Chalmers’ second reason for rejecting this inflationary strategy. He 
tells us that he rejects the inflationary strategy because “where we have substantial knowledge of 
our phenomenal lives, p-zombies can have no such analogous introspective knowledge because 
there is nothing analogous for them to have introspective knowledge of” (ibid.: 328). Since we 1135 
are casting our epistemic situation in topic-neutral language, type-B physicalists can refuse to 
accept Chalmers’ claim that Tom is in possession of knowledge that Zombie-Tom cannot be in 
possession of. Therefore, type-B physicalists will deny the need to inflate Zombie-Tom’s 
knowledge. If this is so, type-B physicalists can dismiss Chalmers’ objections pertaining to the 
inflationary strategy. However, will type-B physicalists be forced to deflate Tom’s knowledge?  1140 
 Chalmers (1996) tells us: “We can note that there is at least a deflationary concept of 
belief that is purely psychological, not involving conscious experience; if a being is in the right 
psychological state, then it is in a state that resembles belief in many important ways, except with 
respect to any phenomenal aspects” (ibid.: 20). Chalmers tells us that these non-phenomenal 
beliefs will resemble phenomenal beliefs without the requirement of involving the concept of 1145 
phenomenal consciousness. Further, these pseudo-beliefs could have the same explanatory power 
“that is done by the concept of belief” (ibid.: 20). However, I think that it is not necessary to 
deflate Tom’s knowledge. PCS can still work by pointing out that the content of Zombie-Tom 
and Tom’s knowledge is different. Suppose that I have a twin (Twin-Diane) living on another 
IN DEFENSE OF THE PHENOMENAL CONCEPT STRATEGY 
 44 
planet identical to Earth. Further, suppose that “vegemite” refers to a spread in our world and 1150 
“vegemitea” is an identical looking spread in my twin’s world. If I believe “Vegemite tastes 
awesome”, my twin will believe “Vegemitea tastes awesome”. Both of our beliefs will be true. 
That is, she and I will share an epistemic situation even though my concept of “vegemite” has 
different content than her concept of “vegemitea”. Our epistemic situation will be shared because 
we will have corresponding beliefs and epistemic status. Any difference between my beliefs’ 1155 
content and that of my twins has no bearing on our epistemic situation. When I utter ‘This spread 
tastes awesome’, you will know that I am referring to vegemite. When my twin utters the same 
sentence, you will know that she is referring to vegemitea. My twin and I have in our possession 
concepts that we will both deploy when we are in the same condition of being hungry, and these 
concepts are linked to certain types of perceptual states (seeing a spread). Chalmers tells us that 1160 
even though the content of our concept is different, my twin and I both have corresponding 
beliefs with equivalent truth-value. So, when both of us utter ‘This is a spread’, we will be 
correct even though we are talking about different things. If this is true, the type-B physicalist 
will assert that Zombie-Tom and Tom do share the same epistemic situation even though their 
concepts are about two different things.  1165 
 However, Chalmers asserts that when it comes to phenomenal states, Zombie-Tom and 
Tom will not share the same epistemic situation. If my twin, who lives on a planet that is 
identical to Earth, and I can share the same epistemic situation, then why cannot Zombie-Tom, 
who lives on planet Zombie, and Tom share the same epistemic situation? After all, there is no 
reason to assume that the content of my and my twin’s states and concepts are the same, so there 1170 
is no reason to assume this about Tom and Zombie-Tom. When Zombie-Tom makes utterances 
about his phenomenal consciousness, he is referring to his schmonsciousness, and we have no 
reason to doubt that. Equally, we have no reason to doubt that when Tom makes utterances 
pertaining to his phenomenal consciousness that he is referring to his phenomenal consciousness.  
 Now, one defending Chalmers could argue that the utterances made by our p-zombie twin 1175 
are false. The falseness of our p-zombie’s utterances is not due to her referring to phenomenal 
states that she does not possess, but is due to her phenomenal states failing to refer. Therefore, 
our analogy concerning vegemite should not be between planet Earth and planet Twin Earth, but 
between Earth and Spread-less Earth. So, Spread-less Diane’s beliefs pertaining to a spread (that 
it tastes awesome) is false because she is under a grand chimera: on her planet there is no such 1180 
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spread. Following this line of thought, Chalmers would be correct in arguing that our p-zombie 
twin does not share our epistemic situation. However, the type-B physicalist can simply refuse to 
accept the analogy of Earth and Spread-less Earth.  
 Still, it is hard to see how my p-zombie twins’ phenomenal concepts fail to refer. 
Phenomenal concepts, when cast topic-neutrally, can be thought of as being employed in a 1185 
recognitional sense in the company of content-bearing mental states such as a perceptual state 
(Carruthers & Veillet, 2007: 133). That is, these concepts are linked to certain types of 
perceptual states (e.g., seeing a spread). I fail to see how her concepts fail to refer to a perceptual 
state that is responsible for her deployment of a concept. Chalmers can attempt to block this by 
telling us: “These [phenomenal] concepts fail to refer because the referent of the concept is 1190 
somehow present inside the concept’s sense” (Chalmers, 2003: 233, brackets mine), i.e., 
something else is built into the content of the concept. For Chalmers then, the phenomenal 
concept should refer to something which is not functional, physical, or psychological. However, 
PCS states that our phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated. So, he (Chalmers) cannot 
suggest that something over and above the functional, physical, and psychological is built into 1195 
the concepts sense because to do so would make Chalmers’ claim inconsistent with PCS.  
 Chalmers (1996) will now argue that it is at the very least plausible that Zombie-Tom’s 
concepts are empty, that is, his concepts and beliefs are content-less (ibid.: 257). In other terms, 
Chalmers is telling us that Tom’s phenomenal beliefs and concepts are partly constituted by 
underlying phenomenal qualities and since Zombie-Tom lacks these qualities he cannot have 1200 
beliefs and concepts with the same content as Tom’s beliefs. However, type-B physicalists will 
quickly respond by saying that Chalmers’ claim is question begging. Chalmers’ idea of 
phenomenal concepts is precisely developed within his own dualistic framework where he 
presupposes entities, such as qualia, as being irreducible. In this section of the paper, I am 
presupposing that phenomenal concepts have characteristics that are topic-neutral. Hence, type-B 1205 
physicalists will argue that all concepts will have some non-phenomenal content. In other terms, 
every concept includes some functional, physical, or psychological quality. Therefore, since we 
are speaking strictly in third-person (topic-neutral) language, Zombie-Toms’ concepts definitely 
share our non-phenomenal content and thus are neither empty nor content-less. For example, 
when both Tom and Zombie-Tom utter, topic-neutrally, “I am phenomenally conscious”, both 1210 
Tom and Zombie-Tom will be referring to consciousness in the same manner, i.e., functionally, 
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physically, and psychologically.  
 Again, our phenomenal concepts can be understood either in first- or third-person 
language, first-person when these concepts are deployed in response to phenomenal states, or 
third-person when these concepts are deployed in response to perceptual states. For example, I 1215 
could say that a first-person perspective of a phenomenal concept would be one where I deploy a 
phenomenal concept while I contemplate ‘this’ experience. Alternatively, I could say that my 
phenomenal concept is deployed by a perceptual state and then describe that perceptual state in 
first-person language by thinking that such states are like ‘this’. When speaking third-personally, 
I could say that my phenomenal concept is a conceptually isolated recognitional concept that I 1220 
deploy when I have a perceptual state (e.g., seeing a spread). In this section, I am focusing 
strictly on the deployment of phenomenal concepts in third-person language. Therefore, Tom and 
Zombie-Tom use their concepts equally because those concepts are deployed in the presence of 
functional, psychological states, and these concepts are conceptually isolated. If Chalmers re-
introduces the ‘phenomenal feel’ of functional, psychological states into the debate for Tom, he 1225 
is illicitly switching the meaning from a third-person characterisation to a first-person 
characterisation. By allowing for the type of content that our phenomenal concepts have into the 
debate, type-B physicalists are given sufficient grounds to argue that Tom and Zombie-Tom both 
gain exactly the same amount of knowledge, however—and crucially—both gain the same 
amount of knowledge about different things (Carruthers and Veillet, 2007: 124). Tom gains 1230 
knowledge pertaining to phenomenal states. Zombie-Tom gains knowledge of schmenomenal 
states. This parallels my knowledge ‘of a spread’ (vegemite) and my twin’s knowledge ‘of a 
spread’ (vegemitea). Therefore, I see no need to deflate whatever knowledge is gained by Tom, 
or inflate whatever knowledge is gained by Zombie-Tom. Type-B physicalists could simply 
assert that the object of knowledge is different in these cases, mine and my twin’s and Tom and 1235 
Zombie-Tom’s.  
 So now let us focus on this question: Is the idea that our p-zombie twin cannot share our 
epistemic situation when cast in topic-neutral language due to their not being in a position to 
conceptualize these epistemic gaps? I will argue the answer to this question is “No”.  
 Returning to Tom and Zombie-Tom, both will share an epistemic situation. Tom’s and 1240 
Zombie-Tom’s phenomenal concepts and quasi-phenomenal concepts respectively are 
conceptually isolated from their physical or functional concepts. Zombie-Tom will be talking 
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about schmonsciousness, using his quasi-phenomenal concepts that are conceptually isolated. 
Therefore, just as Tom concludes there is an epistemic gap between the phenomenal and the 
physical, Zombie-Tom will conclude that there exists an epistemic gap between the physical and 1245 
schmonsciousness. Further, Zombie-Tom will be able to conceive of his duplicate (Zombie-
Zombie-Tom) that lacks what he has, this type of state, and run a master argument like 
Chalmers’. Zombie-Tom could utter: “Hmmm, I can conceive of my duplicate who is 
functionally, physically, and psychologically identical to me but he lacks ‘this’ certain type of 
state.” As argued by Esa Díaz-León (2010), Zombie-Tom will not be in a position to draw a 1250 
logical conclusion that the notion of schmonsciousness derives from schmenomenal truths since 
his concepts are conceptually isolated, so there will be no “hidden contradiction in Zombie-
Toms’ thoughts that he would be capable of detecting a priori” (Carruthers and Veillet, 2007: 
130). Hence, since I am arguing that these gaps can be conceptualized in a topic-neutral 
language, Tom and Zombie-Tom share an equally good (or bad depending upon how you look at 1255 
it) epistemic situation. Therefore, Zombie-Tom will be justified in arguing for the epistemic gaps 
because whatever concept he is inclined to express when he utters ‘this’ will be conceptually 
isolated.  
 One might try to defend Chalmers’ position that our p-zombie twin cannot share our 
epistemic situation and maintain that our epistemic situation must be cast in topic-neutral terms. I 1260 
have argued against this idea, and I do not see this as a possible scenario. We know ex hypothesi 
that the only difference between my p-zombie twin and me is that she lacks something I have, 
phenomenal consciousness. The only way that her epistemic situation can be distinct from mine 
is if we are portraying our (me and my p-zombie twin) epistemic situation in phenomenal 
language. Due to PCS explicitly requiring our epistemic situation, my p-zombie twins’, be cast in 1265 
topic-neutral language, and mine, one cannot argue that our respective epistemic situations 
differ; they must be the same. This makes it impossible for Chalmers to argue that while our 
epistemic situation is being cast in topic-neutral language that we do not share an epistemic 
situation with our p-zombie twin.  
 Now, someone defending Chalmers might assert that when she utters ‘I am phenomenally 1270 
conscious’, she utters a true assertion opposed to my p-zombies’ utterance of the same, therefore, 
allowing one to feel that she is justified in maintaining that p-zombies do not share our epistemic 
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situation. Be that as it may, I am not convinced by this line of reasoning for several reasons. 
First, Chalmers (1996) tells us that from a third-person point of view we must accept:  
“My zombie twin makes the same phenomenal judgments that I do. Where I judge that I 1275 
am conscious, he judges that he is conscious. Further, his judgments are produced by the 
same mechanisms as my judgments. If justification accrues to judgments solely in virtue 
of the mechanisms by which they are formed, as is often supposed, then the zombie's 
judgments will be as justified as mine…. It seems to follow that my judgments cannot be 
justified, either. They are produced by the same mechanisms that are responsible for 1280 
deluded judgments in a zombie, and so they surely cannot qualify as knowledge. If my 
phenomenal judgments are no more justified than a zombie's, then the ground is cut out 
from under the non-reductive position” (ibid.: 192). 
Chalmers’ intuition is that any judgements made by our p-zombie twin must be ‘deluded’. I think 
the use of that term, deluded, is an unfair characterization of the p-zombies judgements. We have 1285 
absolutely no evidence as to whether or not their judgements are deluded. This is a conjecture 
that I do not believe Chalmers is entitled to make. Could not your p-zombie twin be allowed to 
say that your judgements are deluded? Hence, we are confronted with a paradox that Chalmers 
rightly notes in this passage. Let us suppose I told you that your judgements are deluded because 
you lack phenomenal consciousness and my judgements are not deluded because I am in 1290 
possession of phenomenal consciousness, what reaction would you have? I would assume your 
reaction would be to defend yourself by asserting that you are every bit as conscious as I am. 
You might even comment that I have just insulted you. You would argue that we both form 
judgements in the same manner, say, perhaps, from some perceptual state, and if my judgements 
are correct, then so are yours; likewise, if my judgements are deluded, then so are yours. No 1295 
matter what I say to try to convince you that you are deluded, you will make parallel arguments 
to my arguments. Moreover, Chalmers must argue that PCS cannot provide a physical functional 
explanation for why we are confronted with these epistemic gaps because failure to do so would 
put the property dualists’ arguments in dire straights. I think that due to passages like the above 
Chalmers is forced into returning to his argument from a first-person perspective i.e., by bringing 1300 
up the phenomenal feel of some experience.  
 Next, earlier I noted that Chalmers had to re-define how we conceptualize our notion of 
an epistemic situation. I said that: ‘…Chalmers knows that it is notoriously difficult to ascertain 
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the content of someone’s beliefs’ therefore, Chalmers was forced to develop a second definition 
of ‘epistemic situation’. Chalmers’ argument against the idea that my p-zombie twin does not 1305 
share an equally good epistemic situation as I do is based upon controversial ground. This 
unsubstantiated claim puts Chalmers’ argument against PCS on an unstable footing.   
 Finally, if you wish to maintain that the utterance from a p-zombie, who is referring to 
her schmonsciousness when uttering: ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ is false, and your same 
utterance is true because you are referring to your phenomenal consciousness, then you are 1310 
maintaining that both epistemic situations are being cast in first-person language and not in 
topic-neutral (third-person) language. This is the only way that you can conclude that your p-
zombies twins’ utterance is false and that she does not share your epistemic situation. 
Remember, however, in this section of the thesis we are conceiving of both epistemic situations 
as being cast in topic-neutral language.  1315 
 One might now reply, ‘Chalmers must mean he is talking about the ‘phenomenal feel’ of 
a particular state’. However, my concepts and my p-zombie twin’s concepts (described topic-
neutrally) are employed by our individual functional, psychological states, and we know these 
concepts are conceptually isolated from the phenomenal. Again, re-introducing the ‘phenomenal 
feel’ is to illicitly switch from a third-person characterization to a first-person characterization. 1320 
 Chalmers would be in his right to claim that what is at stake is the lack of phenomenal 
states that are referred to by those concepts when the p-zombie deploys them. It is the presence 
of this phenomenal state that makes my epistemic situation distinct from that of my p-zombie 
twin and thereby is the crucial difference between us.  
 Nevertheless, if Chalmers were to argue that it is ‘this’ phenomenal state that makes my 1325 
epistemic situation distinct from my p-zombie twin, then the type-B physicalist will respond by 
asserting that this claim is question begging. If my epistemic situation is, in part, portrayed in 
terms of my possessing this phenomenal state that my p-zombie lacks, then I am saying that it is 
crucial to my epistemic situation that I possess phenomenal states that do not lack qualia whereas 
my p-zombie twin lacks phenomenal states that possess qualia. This is question begging because 1330 
both the property dualist and the type-B physicalist agreed this is understood. Type-B 
physicalists agree with the property dualist that the notion of my p-zombie twin is conceivable, 
but lacks my phenomenal conscious states. However, defenders of PCS assert that PCS can 
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explain why my p-zombie twin is conceivable without resorting to anything existing outside the 
domains of the functional, physical, or psychological.  1335 
Further, there is nothing to say that it is impossible to form a positive notion of how it is 
that consciousness might be a physical property. Conceiving of your p-zombie twin involves 
conjoining the notions of a functional, physical, and psychological duplicate, and 
schmonsciousness, and prima facie this is no more difficult than disjoining our physical 
constitution from our phenomenal consciousness. I will grant that it is difficult to conceive of our 1340 
phenomenal consciousness simply as a by-product of our physical constitution. For example, you 
may ask yourself ‘How could this’ (mentally pointing inward to some past or current experience) 
simply be just a functional, or physical, or psychological state?’ Be that as it may, the level of 
difficulty is not germane here. When we conceive of something, there is no middle ground to 
teeter upon. So conceiving of one state of affairs may simply be more difficult than conceiving 1345 
of another state of affairs, however, conceiving of one state of affairs is no less conceivable than 
the other. For example, it is much harder to conceive of President Obama and Osama bin Laden 
as the same person than to imagine their identity as distinct. Nevertheless, these two scenarios 
are equally important when we are conceiving of some state of affairs. 
 Again, as noted in phase (1) of the quandary, if Chalmers is to insist that PCS is doomed 1350 
to fail because my phenomenal states are part and parcel of my epistemic situation and that PCS 
cannot explain these phenomenal states, then this is to deny PCS before it has a chance to launch. 
By taking this route, Chalmers is again requiring that PCS ought to explain the presence of 
qualia, i.e., phenomenal consciousness. PCS is neither designed nor intended to provide an 
explanation of this; it is to explain why we can conceive of p-zombies, and why we are faced 1355 
with the epistemic gaps. Hence, PCS is not put forth to explain our phenomenal consciousness 
reductively, therefore, our epistemic situation cannot be characterised in such a way as to imply 
‘phenomenal feels’. Chalmers cannot have it both ways, either we understand our epistemic 
situation in phenomenal language and our p-zombie does not share our epistemic situation or our 
epistemic situation is understood in topic-neutral language and p-zombies do share our epistemic 1360 
situation.  
Type-B physicalists will argue that since all we have are functional, physical, and 
psychological properties and no cause to hold that our phenomenal consciousness is distinct from 
that of our p-zombie twin or post-NRT Tom, our phenomenal consciousness stands in an 
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analogous relationship to their schmonsciousness. Our p-zombie twin and post-NRT Tom stand 1365 
in an analogous epistemic relationship to us when our epistemic situation is properly conceived 
in topic-neutral language. This shows us that PCS can and does provide an explanation in 
physical or functional or psychological language of our conception of phenomenal properties that 
does not generate an ontological gap.  
Phase (2) complete 1370 
Synopsis 
 
Type-B physicalists maintain that the physical entails the phenomenal, that an epistemic gap but 
not an ontological gap, exists, and that p-zombies are a conceptual possibility but not a 
metaphysical possibility. They argue that if a p-zombie shares our physical constitution, then it 1375 
necessarily shares our phenomenal properties. Type-B physicalists recognize that there are two 
possible ways to conceive of phenomenal properties. We can think about p-zombies as sharing 
our epistemic situation because they possess functional psychological consciousness identical to 
ours. Or, we can think of them as not sharing our epistemic situation because they lack the 
phenomenal properties of qualia i.e., they lack phenomenal consciousness. In these two ways of 1380 
conceiving of a p-zombie, one not need be worried that a functional or physical explanation of 
our epistemic situation (with respect to phenomenal consciousness or with respect to our 
epistemic gaps) will not pertain correspondingly to zombies since that explanation can be applied 
correspondingly to either with the same amount of power. 
Type-B physicalists argue that our p-zombie twin and post-NRT Tom will necessarily be 1385 
conscious (i.e., they possess schmonsciousness). Since we have phenomenal concepts that are 
conceptually isolated from our physical concepts, we have the ability to think in terms of the 
phenomenal. It is conceptual isolation that makes it possible for us to think in terms of 
conceivability, thereby affording us the ability to conceive of p-zombies lacking phenomenal 
consciousness and rendering them mindless beings. I do not think that the type-B physicalist 1390 
need be worried since we are conceiving of a hypothetical creature (our p-zombie twin) that is 
not a metaphysical possibility and therefore cannot be an authentic representation of how we 
truly identify with phenomenal consciousness. Our (to use Chalmers’ 1996 vocabulary) 
“suffering” under C and our ability to conceive of such creatures does not entail that a functional 
or physical explanation of consciousness leaves something out because, for type-B physicalists, 1395 
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the phenomenal is physical. Therefore, there is no reason to posit that phenomenal consciousness 
is ontologically distinct where a functional or physical explanation is incapable of explaining it.  
Earlier I discussed post-NRT Tom, our functional silicon zombie. Post-NRT Tom like 
our p-zombie twin is a being that shares our functional physical constitution excluding his brain, 
which is comprised of silicon and not carbon-based like our brain. This renders our silicon 1400 
zombie a mindless being, for him all is dark inside. I also noted that it is an open question for 
type-B physicalists as to whether this type of zombie (a functional silicon zombie) is a 
metaphysical and conceptual possibility. Suppose Chalmers’ second horn is strictly a functional 
analysis. On this analysis, post-NRT Tom is acquainted with phenomenal concepts and these 
concepts will behave in a manner that will be identical to the behaviour of our phenomenal 1405 
concepts (in third-person language). That is, post-NRT Tom necessarily needs to stand in an 
acquaintance relationship with the Mona Lisa in order to come into possession of the 
phenomenal concept ‘brilliant blues’; we will have to do the exact same in order to acquire a 
phenomenal concept. Once he acquires the phenomenal concept, he, too, will suffer under C.  
 I claim just because we humans suffer under C and have the intuition that we are in 1410 
possession of phenomenal properties does not necessarily mean we are granted some privileged 
epistemological access to states that post-NRT Tom or our p-zombie twin cannot enjoy or share 
with us. Whether post-NRT Tom or our p-zombie twin, both zombie types will be in possession 
of schmonsciousness. Schmonsciousness is responsible for allowing their schmenomenal 
concepts to refer to their internal mental states and properties in just the same manner as our 1415 
phenomenal concepts refer to our internal mental states and properties, therefore, showing an 
analogous relationship between the zombie and us in that the explanatory power is the same. 
 My response is not the only way one could respond to Chalmers. For example, one might 
respond to Chalmers by objecting to Chalmers and Jackson (2001) a priori entailment thesis. 
One could argue that there are various ways in which this thesis could be undermined. For 1420 
example, see Carruthers (2004) “Reductive Explanation and the ‘Explanatory Gap’. Next, one 
could argue that arguments, such as Keith Frankish’s (2007) “Anti-Zombie Argument”, show 
Chalmers’ master argument is itself superfluous. Finally, one could respond to Chalmers by 
arguing that our phenomenal concepts are understood in one of three ways. For example, one 
could argue that phenomenal concepts are strictly to be understood either demonstratively, 1425 
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representationally, or constitutionally. For example, see Robert Schroer (2010) “Where’s the 
Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial”.x 
 My response to Chalmers’ dilemma is limited to showing how his dilemma is faced with 
a dilemma without adhering to strictly one view of phenomenal concepts. I maintain that PCS 
can and does provide a powerful reply to the property dualists’ assertions and intuition pumps. I 1430 
reached the conclusion that Chalmers cannot demand that our epistemic situation must be cast in 
topic-neutral language and yet still be different from our p-zombie twins epistemic situation. If 
Chalmers were to now say that p-zombies do share our epistemic situation, then the second horn 
in his master argument fails. If Chalmers were to now say that our epistemic situation needs to be 
cast in phenomenal language, then his master argument becomes the claim that PCS must accept 1435 
that a new gap develops between either the physical and C (when cast phenomenally) or C (when 
cast topic-neutrally) and our epistemic situation. However, PCS predicts these gaps and is able to 
provide an explanation for why we see these new epistemic gaps. Overall, I think I have given a 
plethora of reasons for my belief that Chalmers’ master argument against PCS fails.  
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Notes 
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i Phenomenal consciousness is to be understood throughout the body of this paper by the 
definition that Thomas Nagel (1974) offered. He tells us that what it means to be phenomenally 
conscious is to have a subjective experience where there is something it is like to be in a 
phenomenal conscious state. 
 
ii A posteriori physicalism is the thesis that denies the path from microphysical facts (low-level) 
to mental facts (high-level) is a priorily known. However, a posteriori physicalists argue that the 
microphysical facts establish all high-level facts. This may sound confusing so an example will 
help to illuminate this idea. We can say that it is not known a priori from “Stephen King was 
born on September 21, 1947” and “Richard Bachman wrote “The Dark Half”” that Stephen King 
wrote “The Dark Half”. Nevertheless, the previous facts wholly entail the latter. Hence, there is 
no way to surmise a priori that Stephen King wrote “The Dark Half” since our beginning facts 
are not all-inclusive. We might have been able to conclude a priori that Stephen King wrote 
“The Dark Half” if we were told that Stephen King and Richard Bachman are one in the same 
identity from the start.  
 Still, it is not clear how it is we could be in possession of the all-inclusive facts pertaining 
to the microphysical that entail all the high-level facts yet do not a priori entail them. It seems 
that we need something further to get from the microphysical to the high-level (mental) facts, 
which are not constituted by the physical. In order to get from the microphysical to the high-level 
a priorily we need some further information (assumptions) and this is called ‘bridge laws’. Yet, 
bridge laws cannot fix the issue of deducing the high-level from the microphysical. To briefly 
cash this out, let us look at Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument (Jackson, 1982). We are told 
that Mary is an omniscient neuroscientist that has been held prisoner, since birth, in a 
monochrome room. We can posit that Mary knows all the microphysical facts, and has in her 
possession further information (bridge laws). She has full capacity to deduce what it will be like 
to experience the colour red, yet, when Mary is released from her monochrome room, many 
philosophers argue that Mary learns something new when she experiences red for the first time. 
If this is true, then the bridge laws were of no use to Mary, and thus we are still left with our 
original difficulty of getting from the microphysical facts to the high-level facts.  
 Moreover, some type-B physicalists maintain a type of conceptual dualism with an 
associated ontological monism. Robert Francescotti (2000) describes ontological monism as the 
thesis that for any high-level phenomena, there is a physical property, such that the high-level 
phenomena are identical to the physical property (ibid.: 350). By maintaining ontological 
monism, physicalists can argue that there does not exist an ontological gap in the presence of an 
explanatory gap. They assert that phenomenal concepts are different from any functional or 
physical concepts (conceptual dualism) and they claim that phenomenal properties, such as 
qualia, are identical to certain functional or physical properties (Chalmers, 2010: 307-8). 
Therefore, by maintaining conceptual dualism, type-B physicalists cannot deny the explanatory 
gap because it has been argued that conceptual dualism gives rise to the explanatory gap. By 
maintaining ontological monism, type-B physicalists deny an ontological gap. The type-B 
physicalist accepts that there is a hard problem, but this hard problem is not indicative of an 
ontological gap. The hard problem is the lack of explanatory power, resulting in epistemic gaps. 
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iii For more on the various ways that qualia are understood see e.g. Ned Block, 1990; David 
Chalmers, 1996; Daniel Dennett, 1988; Fred Dretske, 1995; Galilei, 2008; Frank Jackson, 1982; 
William Lycan, 2008; Peter Mandik, 2006; Thomas Nagel 1974; Smythies, 2008; and White, 
2008. 
 
iv A priori physicalism (dubbed “type-A physicalism” by David Chalmers (2002) is the thesis 
that if one knows every fact pertaining to the physical, one would not need bridge laws, or 
further information, in order to know all the high-level (mental) facts. Type-A physicalists argue 
that the only things that need explaining are how we account for the function of various 
phenomena. Once there is an explanation of the various functions involved, everything has been 
explained. For some type-A physicalists, consciousness exists but in terms such as 
‘reportability’. So, they deny any relevant epistemic gap.  
 
v Type-B physicalists argue that PCS discriminates between functional or physical concepts and 
phenomenal concepts. Type-B physicalists posit that our phenomenal states can be identified by 
specific functional or physical states. This identity is not grasped through a priori knowledge but 
rather, through empirical science (a posteriori knowledge). For example, the concept ‘gas’ is 
distinct from the concept ‘C8H18’. The role of this example is to show that it is a scientific 
discovery that our concepts ‘gas’ and ‘C8H18’ refer to the same properties, i.e., it is not a priori 
known that these concepts refer to the same property. The type-B physicalist maintains that the 
same idea holds for phenomenal consciousness. Even though the functional or physical concepts 
and the phenomenal concepts may pick out the same entities, these concepts are conceptually 
isolated. Further, due to these concepts being conceptually isolated, one cannot rely purely on a 
priori reasoning when one is attempting to logically decide if a phenomenal explanation refers to 
a functional or physical explanation. Our cognitive system has distinctive roles for the different 
concepts and these roles are responsible for keeping these concepts isolated (Loar, 1999: 597). 
For this reason it is imperative that phenomenal concepts be understood as conceptually isolated 
from functional or physical concepts. Conceptual isolation plays a significant role in PCS. 
 
vi Chalmers and Jackson (2001) argue that the a priori entailment thesis is a necessary part of any 
reductive explanation in physical terms. The following shows the structure of their argument:  
i. There is an a priori entailment form microphysical truths to ordinary macroscopic truths. 
ii. If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, then 
reductive explanation of the phenomenal fails. 
iii. If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, 
physicalism is false. 
iv. There is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths. 
v. Therefore, reductive explanation of phenomenal truths in physical terms fails (ibid.: 208). 
Most of the literature that examines Chalmers’ master argument uses the term ‘physical 
explanation’ while describing the structure of this argument. Chalmers, himself, uses the same 
terminology. As long as we remember, exactly, how Chalmers has defined ‘physical 
explanation’ there should be no confusion between the terminological the differences of a 
physical explanation and a reductive explanation, because a reductive explanation is how he 
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defines a physical explanation. For more on this see Chalmers, 1996; 2006; 2010; and Chalmers 
and Jackson, 2001. 
 
vii My understanding of a thickly individuated fact is that one may maintain the fact of some 
thing that is situated in many different thoughts. For example, the fact that I am looking at ten 
toes, and the fact that the number of toes I am looking at is the smallest even number greater than 
eight, is the identical fact. A thinly individuated fact, on my understanding, is a fact of some 
thing can be distinctly singled out in terms of the ideas used to convey them. In the example 
above, a thin account would claim these are not the same fact, but are two distinct facts. 
 
viii A defender of Chalmers may argue that our epistemic situation is understood only in terms of 
distinctive epistemic gaps, but this will not work, either. I hope to address this in section 8. 
 
ix For example, Carruthers (2004) and Loar (2007).  
 
x Phenomenal Concepts are Distinctive 
In order to defend conceptual dualism and ontological monism from the assertion that conceptual 
dualism culminates into ontological dualism, the type-B physicalists asserts that there are 
distinctive features of our phenomenal concepts. In the following, I will briefly sketch how 
physicalists defend these distinctive features of phenomenal concepts.  
A Constitutional Account of Phenomenal Concepts 
Most accounts of phenomenal concepts fall into the representational theory of mind (RTM). 
Jerry Fodor (2008) asserts that the RTM can be understood as the thoughts we think, and the 
beliefs we form, all take the form of a mental representation. It is not necessarily the case that 
our propositional attitudes must have truth-values, or must be justified. When we consider this 
understanding of RTM, the very act of thinking is an “internal language of thought” (Mentalese) 
i.e., mental images and sentences of the internal language of thought where one has the ability to 
control terms Fodor (2008). Chalmers asserts, in a footnote, that concepts are part of our mental 
representations and that concepts are part of our beliefs. “I take concepts to be mental entities on 
a par with beliefs: they are constituents of beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) in a manner 
loosely analogous to the way in which words are constituents of sentences. Like beliefs, concepts 
are tokens rather than types in the first instance” (Chalmers, 2003: 223, parenthetical original). 
Therefore, the mental images can be thought of as concepts we use. The concepts form sentences 
in our language of thought, and might be part of, or constituents of, our beliefs.    
 Further, according to Fodor’s language of thought, there is a causal connection between 
our phenomenal concepts and its referents. These referents are phenomenal properties (qualia). 
These referents are said to be “the content of concepts” (Fodor, 2008: 16) and this is what makes 
it a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts. If the referents are not part of the content of 
the concept, then this is considered a non-constitutional account. 
Phenomenal Concepts as Pure Demonstratives 
An indexical demonstrative is an expression where one must provide some type of 
demonstration, for example, pointing. If I utter “That’s Tim” and I demonstrate that that is Tim 
by the act of a pointing gesture, then my pointing refers to, or picks out, the object ‘Tim’ and my 
demonstration is the act of pointing. However, according to David Kaplan (1989) with pure 
indexical demonstratives it is not the case that there is a demonstration that is required. Pure 
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indexical demonstratives such as ‘I’, and ‘today’, are self-referential.  
An account of type-demonstrative phenomenal concepts is provided by Brian Loar 
(1990/1997) although, he labels his account of phenomenal concepts as “recognitional/ 
imaginative concepts” (Loar, 1997: 87). According to Loar, a phenomenal concept directly picks 
out its referent because we have the capacity to make judgements based solely upon 
recognitional dispositions; we do not have to call to any theoretical knowledge or any 
background knowledge concerning the phenomenal property of ‘what it is like to x’ (Loar, 1997: 
87).  
 
